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"BUT ONLY ON A QUESTION OF LAW": EXAMINING THE SCOPE OF
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE LANDLORD AND TENANT BOARD
TOBY YOUNG*
RtSUMk
Selon la Loi sur la location i usage d'habitation, 2006, la competence d'un tribunal
d'appel en revision de decisions de la Commission de la location immobili~re est
limit~e aux questions de droit. Cet article a deux objectifs principaux : rexamen des
limites et des contours de ce qui pourrait constituer o une question de droit> aux fins
d'appel de la Commission et lexamen de la norme de contr6le judiciaire applicable.
La norme de contr6le judiciaire applicable d6pend en grande partie de la nature de la
(< question de droit > soulev~e en appel, et dans ce cas la norme est semblable h celle
appliqu~e aux appels de decisions judiciaires.
I1 est g~n~ralement admis que la norme est celle de la decision correcte quant aux
questions de droit, et de ce fait, il est de la plus haute importance de pr~ciser ce qui
constitue une question de droit - ce qui n'est pas toujours facile. Cet article 6tudie
h fond comment extraire des questions de droit a partir de questions de fait ou de
questions mixtes de fait et de droit. De plus, certaines questions de droit - c.-A-d. les
r~gles de la justice naturelle, le devoir d'quit6 de la procedure et le pouvoir discr&
tionnaire conf~r6 par la loi - font appel h une norme diff~rente du fait d'approches
analytiques distinctes appliqu~es a ces types de questions juridiques.
Larticle passe en revue Dunsmuir c. Nouveau-Brunswick, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 190, oil la
Cour supreme du Canada a 6clairci le fait qu'il n'existe plus A present que deux nor-
mes de revision - celle de la d6cision correcte et celle de la raisonnabilit6 - et 6value
t'impact de cet 6claircissement sur la norme en usage A la Commission. IEarticle fait
valoir que Dunsmuir n'aura pas un impact d'importance a la Commission et cela lar-
gement du fait que la Commission ne poss~de pas d'expertise hautement sp~cialis~e.
Toby Young is a Director of Legal Services at the Human Rights Centre Legal Support Centre. He is the
former Provincial Director of the Tenant Duty Counsel Program at the Advocacy Centre for Tenants
Ontario. He specialized in residential tenancy law for over a decade. This article expresses the personal
views of the author and reflects the law as of June 2008.
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INTRODUCTION
The central purpose of this article is to examine the scope of appellate review1 of the
Landlord and Tenant Board2 under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.3 The article
will show, as a very general proposition, that appellate review of the Board is driven
primarily-as are appeals of judicial decisions-by the underlying policy considera-
tions regarding the appropriate role of an appellate court. The determination of the
standard of review to be applied to the Board turns largely on the nature of the ques-
tion at issue because the main justifications for deference to administrative decisions
by appellate courts-privative clauses and relative expertise-are not factors that
ought to apply in the review of Board decisions. Therefore, despite the fact that an
administrative law standard of review analysis is inapplicable to judicial decisions,
4
the standards applied to the appellate review of the Board and the appellate review
of judicial decisions are essentially indistinguishable. 5 Moreover, this article suggests
that the express provision in the RTA setting out appellate jurisdiction to "only ques-
tions of law" has little, if any, impact and, as a practical matter, does very little to
restrict the scope of appellate review that would occur if review of questions of mixed
fact and law or of fact alone were expressly referenced in the RTA.
More specifically, this article has three other objectives. First, it seeks to identify the
types of questions of law that may be the subject of appeal (e.g. jurisdiction, statutory
interpretation, and natural justice and procedural fairness). Second, it acknowledges
and explores the sometimes contentious task of how questions of law are character-
1. In this paper, the term "appellate review" refers to the review of Landlord and Tenant Board [Board]
decisions by way of statutory right of appeal under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17
[RTA] and is used in contradistinction to the term "judicial review," meaning the review of Board deci-
sions by way of application for judicial review. This paper focuses on appellate review although some
reference is made to judicial reviews, a fairly uncommon event in residential tenancy law.
2. See RTA, sections 168 to 182. The predecessor to the Board was the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal
[ORHT or Tribunal]. The Tribunal existed from 1998 to 2006.
3. S.O. 2006, c. 17. The RTA was proclaimed on force on 31 January 2007. Section 210(1) provides that
any person affected by an order of the Board may appeal to the Divisional Court, "but only on a ques-
tion of law." The RTA's predecessor, the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.0 1997, c. 24 [TPA], was identi-
cal to the RTA in this respect (section 196(1) TPA). In contrast, the TPA's predecessor, the Landlord and
Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.7 [LTA], at section 116(1) provided that an appeal was available "from a
final order of a judge"
4. In Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 at para. 33 [Dr.
Q.] McLachlin C.J.C. for the Court observed that the "conceptual foundation of review of administra-
tive decisions is fundamentally different than that of appeals from judicial decisions" and that "in the
context of judicial review of administrative action, the nature of the question is just one of four factors
to consider when determining the standard of review."
5. SeeZeitounetal. v. The Economical Insurance Group (2008), 91 O.R. (3d) 131 (Div Ct.), which held that
the same standard of review applies to appeals from masters and from judges. The decision of a master
should be interfered with only if the master made an error of law or exercised his or her discretion
on wrong principles or misapprehended evidence such that there was palpable and overriding error.
These standards of review are, it is argued, equally applicable to most tribunals, including the Board.
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ized, with a particular focus on how courts may extract questions of law from what
appears to be other types of questions (i.e. questions of mixed fact and law, questions
of fact and the exercise of statutory discretion). Third, it reviews the appropriate
degree of deference that an appellate court may apply to the particular question of
law before it (i.e. standard of review).
It is understood that statutory appeals are inherently limited exercises. They are not
intended to be a retrial of a case or a hearing de novo. An appellate court's basic insti-
tutional role is to preserve and uphold the rule of law by identifying and correcting
legal error. As noted by Charles Alan Wright:
Everyone agrees, so far as I know, that one function of an appellate court is to discover and
declare-or to make-the law. From the earliest times appellate courts have been empow-
ered to reverse for errors of law, to announce the rules which are to be applied, and to ensure
uniformity in the rules applied by various inferior tribunals.
6
The principles that lead to a posture of general deference toward trial courts are, it is
suggested, largely applicable to administrative tribunals. As a matter of broad policy,
appellate courts are concerned about contributing to any undue increase in the
number and length of appeals, recognize the autonomy and integrity of trial courts
(and the legislative delegation of certain matters to tribunals), and are conscious that
increased appellate intervention could make the appellate forum available primarily
to wealthier parties.7 In contrast, the primary role of trial courts and administrative
tribunals, including the Board, is to resolve disputes by making findings of fact and
applying settled law.
Because the RTA expressly permits appeals on questions of law alone, the character-
ization of the question on appeal is crucial. For instance, are questions of mixed fact
and law immune to the scope of appellate review? Such questions may be capable of
being recast as legitimate questions of law or, perhaps more precisely, questions of
law may be able to be extracted from questions of mixed fact and law. The Supreme
Court of Canada has recognized the challenge in drawing hard and fast distinctions
between the various types of legal errors and, in particular, between a question of
law and a question of mixed fact and law.8 Moreover, errors of fact, if sufficiently
6. Charles Alan Wright, "The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts" (1956-57) 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751
at 779.
7. R.D. Gibbens, "Appellate Review of Findings of Fact" (1991-92) 13 Advocates' Q. 445 at 447-48.
8. In Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., (1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 at para. 35
[Southam] the Supreme Court per Iacobucci J., noted:
Briefly stated, questions of law are questions about what the correct legal test is; questions of fact are
questions about what actually took place between the parties; and questions of mixed law and fact
are questions about whether the facts satisfy the legal tests. A simple example will illustrate these
concepts. In the law of tort, the question what negligence means is a question of law. The question
whether the defendant did this or that is a question of fact. And, once it has been decided that the
applicable standard is one of negligence, the question whether the defendant satisfied the appropri-
ate standard of care is a question of mixed law and fact. I recognize, however, that the distinction be-
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serious,9 can amount to questions of law as, for example, findings of fact based on no
evidence or a misapprehension of the evidence. In addition, the exercise of statutory
discretion in a manner that includes factors deemed to be outside the statutory grant
of discretionary jurisdiction may also constitute a question of law.
The standard of review applied by the courts to Board decisions ought to be correct-
ness in virtually every appeal but not because the scope of appellate jurisdiction is
restricted to questions of law. Once a question of law is identified, there is no basis for
any deference by the court due to the lack of any specialized expertise at the Board.
The mere legislative choice of the Board to deal with residential tenancy matters
cannot carry any assumption of expertise. In short, it is argued that the court may
adopt a deferential approach to issues within the special expertise of administrative
tribunals in the face of a strong privative clause but, even in those circumstances, the
tribunal must have expertise on the particular question before it. It is suggested that
there is no question of law upon which the Board can be considered to have greater,
or even equal, expertise than a reviewing court.
This article is divided into seven sections. The first section provides an overview of
the standard of review analysis to be applied in appeals from the Board. Each of the
subsequent five sections also includes a review of the applicable standard of review
to be applied to the types of legal error that are commonly raised at the Board. In
particular, the second section deals with questions of law and the difficult exercise
that delineating a question of law can be. The third section examines questions of
mixed fact and law and, in particular, demonstrates how a question of law may be ex-
tracted from an apparent question of mixed fact and law. The fourth section reviews
questions of fact and, once again, examines how questions of law may be extracted
by finding error in the Board's fact-finding process and its treatment of the evidence.
The fifth section addresses the matter of reviewing the Board's statutory powers of
discretion. Discretionary decisions are essentially fact-based exercises given wide
latitude, but the courts have wrestled with the issue of the proper scope of the Board's
discretionary jurisdiction. The sixth section examines questions of natural justice
and procedural fairness and the judicial pressure to be, on the one hand, the ultimate
arbiter of fairness but, on the other hand, to also provide a degree of respect for the
legislature's choice of procedures in the RTA. In the seventh and final section of the
article, the Board's duty to provide reasons as a component of the duty of procedural
fairness will be examined. As will be seen, inadequate reasons themselves can pro-
tween law on the one hand and mixed law and fact on the other is difficult. On occasion, what appears
to be mixed law and fact turn out be law, or vice versa. [Emphasis added.]
See Paul Bunyan Trailer Camp Limited v. McCormick, [1999] O.J. No. 5784 at para. 8 (Div. Ct.) [Paul
Bunyan] for an application of the Southam analysis in the residential landlord and tenant context.
9. See below, Reviewing Questions of Fact.
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vide the basis for an appeal as an error of law. 10 However, precisely what constitutes
inadequate reasons in a case is a matter of some subjectivity and there is no clear,
bright line distinction that may be relied upon consistently for any guidance.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The determination of the operative standard of review is as much an exercise in judicial
self-discipline as it is an exercise in statutory interpretation.11
The standard of review analysis is derived from two distinct adjudicative contexts-
the courts and administrative tribunals-resulting in two distinct approaches to the
standard of review analysis, with some degree of overlap between the two approach-
es. In some respects, it is misleading to even speak of a "standard of review" analysis
with respect to court decisions because that formal analysis is applicable only to the
appellate and judicial review of administrative decision-making. In the courts, the
analysis has essentially centred on the nature of the question before the court; in
particular, is this a question of law, a question of mixed fact and law, or a question of
fact? Different standards have been articulated by the courts, depending on which
type of question is being reviewed. 12 In contrast, in the context of administrative ac-
tion, the nature of the question is viewed as but one of four factors to be considered
in determining the appropriate standard of review. Nevertheless, both the appellate
review and judicial review of administrative action, recently subjected to substantive
revision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,13 seek
the same objective of determining the proper scope of deference to be given to an
administrative decision.
In the administrative context, Sara Blake notes that the standard of review jurispru-
dence reflects a tension about the appropriate roles of the courts and the legislature:
Unstated but underpinning the analysis is the separation of powers between the court and
the legislature and executive, of which tribunals form a part. The court may not review the
wisdom of government policy. Its role is to supervise tribunals to ensure that they act law-
fully. The court must defer to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute. The
court's constitutional duty is to protect the rule of law.
14
10. In Natarelli v. Sheikh, [2007] O.J. No. 604 at para. 5 (Div. Ct.) the court held that "[flailing to give rea-
sons in support of the amount of damages and failing to explain why the adjournment was not granted
are errors of law.'
11. Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 566, at para. 34 (C.A.) per Doherty
J.A.
12. The standards applied by the courts also operate on the basis that all of these questions are subject to
review, absent any statutory direction to the contrary
13. [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir].
14. Sara Blake, Administrative Law in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2006) at 206. See also Dun-
smuir, supra note 13 at para. 27 per Bastarache and LeBel JJ.
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The central question to be decided by a court was succinctly expressed in Pasiechnyk
v. Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board)15 emphasizing the importance of
legislative intent: "[W] as the question which the provision raises one that was in-
tended by the legislators to be left to the exclusive decision of the Board?"
16
Moreover, the jurisprudence has developed in the context of both applications for
judicial review and statutory rights of appeal.17 This has had important implications
in the determination of the appropriate standard. For example, the consideration of
a privative clause does not genuinely arise in the context of the statutory right of ap-
peal from the Board. A privative clause purports to restrict courts from intervening
in tribunal decisions. A statutory right of appeal, in contrast, indicates a legislative
intent to grant greater appellate scrutiny and, in general, the jurisdiction of a court
on appeal is broader than the jurisdiction on judicial review. Moreover, the Board's
expertise and the principle of the specialization of duties inherent in the delegation
of landlord and tenant disputes to the Board are essential factors to be considered.'
8
In other words, to particularize the issue of determining legislative intent as set out
in Pasiechnyk'9 with respect to the Board: Was the question that the provision raises
one that falls squarely within the Board's area of expertise?
Pre-Dunsmuir: The Pragmatic and Functional Approach
Until Dunsmuir,20 the standard ofreview in all cases of appellate and judicial reviewwas
determined by the "pragmatic and functional approach"21 which created a spectrum
15. [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890 [Pasiechnyk].
16. Ibid. at para. 18 per Sopinka J.
17. It has been noted, however, that the standard of review jurisprudence has developed more so in the
context of judicial review applications: see Paul Rapsey, "Standard of Review from Decisions of the On-
tario Rental Housing Tribunal" (2002) 17 J. L. Soc. Pory 1 at 2. There are few judicial review decisions
in the residential tenancy context. A notable exception is Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v.
Godwin (2002), 161 O.A.C. 57 (C.A.) [Godwin], which found the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to hear
representative evidence. No standard of review analysis was undertaken by the Court of Appeal but
the Divisional Court did so in Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority v. Godwin (2002), 50 O.R. (3d)
207 at paras. 37 and 38 (Div. Ct.), per O'Driscoll J. and concluded that if the question of law at issue is
within the tribunal's jurisdiction, it would exceed its jurisdiction only if it errs in a patently unreason-
able manner. If, however, the question at issue concerned a legislative provision limiting the tribunal's
powers, a mere error would cause it to lose jurisdiction and subject the tribunal to judicial review. See
Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 [Pezim], Southam, supra
note 8, and Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722 [Bell] for authority on the applicable standard of review in the context of statutory
appeals.
18. See Bell, supra note 17 at 1745-46 per Gonthier J.
19. Supra note 15.
20. Supra note 13.
21. See U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 at 1088 per Beetz J.; Pushpanathan v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 [Pushpanathan], Moreau-Bfrubg v. New
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of levels of deference: correctness, 22 reasonableness simpliciter (reasonableness), 23
and patent unreasonableness. 24 This approach involved weighing four factors, none
of which was solely dispositive:
25
1. the presence or absence of a privative clause or statutory right of appeal;
2. the expertise of the administrative tribunal relative to the reviewing court
regarding the question at issue;
3. the purpose of the legislation, and the statutory provision in particular;
and
4. the nature of the question: law, fact, or mixed law and fact.
2 6
In Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan,27 the Supreme Court noted that when
in the process of reviewing a decision for correctness "the court may undertake its
own reasoning process to arrive at the result it judges correct.' 28 In reviewing for
reasonableness, a court must not interfere unless the party seeking review has posi-
tively shown that the decision, taken as a whole, was unreasonable. The focus is on
the reasons for decision. An unreasonable decision is "one that, in the main, is not
supported by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination "29
Finally, the most deferential standard-patent unreasonableness-involved an error
that was "apparent on the face of the record and was so immediate and obvious that
there was no real possibility of doubting the decision was defective. 3 °
Brunswick (Judicial Council), [20021 1 S.C.R. 249 [Moreau-Brubel; and Dr. Q., supra note 4, at paras.
22, 26.
22. Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247 [Ryan] at para. 50.
23. Ibid. at para. 47. Until 1997 in Southam, supra note 8, and the development of the reasonableness
standard, there were only the correctness and the patent unreasonableness standards available to a
reviewing court.
24. Ibid. at para. 52.
25. Re Cartaway Resources Corp., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 672 at para. 44.
26. Ryan, supra note 22, at para. 27.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. at para. 50.
29. Ibid. at para. 48 (citing Southam, supra note 8):
An unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported by any reasons that can stand up
to a somewhat probing examination. Accordingly, a Court reviewing a conclusion on the reasona-
bleness standard must look to see whether any reasons support it. The defect, if there is one, could
presumably be in the evidentiary foundation itself or in the logical process by which conclusions are
sought to be drawn from it.
30. Ryan, supra note 22 at para. 52. In Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick
Liquor Corp. (1979), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417 at 425 (S.C.C) Dickson I. described the patently unreasonable
standard as follows: "[W]as the Board's interpretation so patently unreasonable that its construction
cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation and demands intervention by the court upon
review?"
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In residential tenancy jurisprudence there has been a rather reflexive adoption of
the correctness standard of review and an absence of analysis, primarily due to the
statutory provision limiting appeals to questions of law.3 1 The jurisprudence re-
veals, however, that all three standards of review have been applied: correctness,
32
reasonableness, 33 and patent unreasonableness. 34
Post-Dunsmuir: The New Standard of Review Analysis
In Dunsmuir,35 the Supreme Court extensively reconsidered the standard of review
jurisprudence and concluded that the two variants of reasonableness review-rea-
sonableness and patent unreasonableness-should be collapsed into a single form
of "reasonableness" review. Thus, there are now only two remaining standards of
correctness and reasonableness, 36 and the "pragmatic and functional approach" ter-
minology has been supplanted by a "standard of review analysis" 37 The court clari-
fied that "[a] n exhaustive review is not required in every case" and only where the
existing jurisprudence does not clearly reveal the proper standard to be applied does
31. See Samuel Property Management v. Nicholson (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 470 (C.A.) at para. 4; North York
General Hospital Foundation v. Armstrong (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 603 (Div. Ct.) [North York General Hos-
pital] at para. 21; and Chenard v. Foster, [2007] O.J. No. 4671 (Div. Ct.) at para. 5.
32. See Briarlane Property Management Inc. v. Bradt, [2004] O.J. No. 1452 (Div. Ct.); North York General
Hospital, supra note 31; Hung v. C.L.K. Enterprises Inc., [1999] O.J. No. 3559 (Div. Ct.); Belleau v. Vic-
toria Park Community Homes (8 February 2000), Court File No. 99-1867-DV (Div. Ct.); Dollimore v.
Azuria Group Inc., [2001] O.J. No. 4408 (Div. Ct.) at para. 2; and 4750, 4752, 4754 Dundas Street West
(Tenants of) v. Wuebbolt, [2001] O.J. No. 4001 (Div. Ct.) (at least arguably although it is not clearly
stated in these terms).
33. See Paul Bunyan supra note 8; Burt Dozet Management Inc. v. Goharzad, [2001 ] O.J. No. 550 (Div. Ct.)
(on consent on this issue); and possibly MacKay v. Sanghera, [2001] O.J. No. 2600 (Div. Ct.) (although
the court also held that decision was correct).
34. See Smolcec v. Longhouse Village (Thunder Bay) Inc. (2001), 32 Admin. L.R. (3d) 72 (Div. Ct.) [Smol-
cec].
35. Supra note 13.
36. Ibid. at paras. 45 to 50. The court went on to define the two standards:
Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development
of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative
tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a
number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the
range of acceptable and rational solutions.
When applying the correctness standard, a reviewing court will not show deference to the decision
maker's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will
bring the court to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the decision maker; if not, the
court will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer. From the outset, the court must
ask whether the tribunal's decision was correct (at para. 50). [Emphasis added.]
37. Ibid. at para. 63.
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a court need to embark on an analysis of the factors to identify the proper standard
of review.38 The joint reasons for judgment stated:
The analysis must be contextual. As mentioned above, it is dependent on the application
of a number of relevant factors, including: (1) the presence or absence of a privative clause;
(2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; (3)
the nature of the question at issue; and (4) the expertise of the tribunal, In many cases it will
not be necessary to consider all of the factors, as some of them may be determinative in the
application of the reasonableness standard in a specific case.
39
With regard to the nature of the question of law at issue, a distinction was made be-
tween a question of law that is of central importance to the legal system and outside
the area of expertise of an administrative tribunal (which would always attract a cor-
rectness standard)" ° and a question of law that does not rise to that level.
41
What, if any, impact will this have in the Board context? It is argued that Dunsmuir
42
will likely lead to an even less formal application of the standard of review factors
than is already the case and that once a question of law is identified, given the broad
right of appeal, the correctness standard will invariably be applied. The sole excep-
tion may be those questions of law that formerly attracted the standard of patent
unreasonableness: discretionary decisions.43 Justice Binnie, in concurring reasons,44
noted that while a court ought generally to respect the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion, particularly in the face of a privative clause, this is not the case where there
38. Ibid. at paras. 57, 62, 64.
39. Ibid. at para. 64 [emphasis added] per Bastarache and LeBel JI. Dunsmuir includes three sets of reasons:
joint reasons for judgment per Bastarache and LeBel JI. (McLachlin C.J. and Fish and Abella JJ. concur-
ring) and two sets of concurring reasons per Binne J. and per Deschamps J. (Charron and Rothstein JJ.
concurring).
40. Ibid. at para. 55 (citing Toronto (City) v. C. UPE. (Local 79), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77). The court noted that
the following types of questions would attract the correctness standard: constitutional questions such
as those regarding the division of powers between Parliament and the provinces (para. 58); true ques-
tions of jurisdiction or vires, i.e. where the tribunal must explicitly determine whether its statutory
grant of power gives it the authority to decide a particular matter (para. 59); where the issue is one of
general law "that is both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudica-
tor's specialized area of expertise" (para. 60); and questions regarding the jurisdictional lines between
two or more competing specialized tribunals (para. 61).
41. Ibid. at para. 55. Bastarache and LeBel JJ. concluded, at para. 71, that considering the privative clause,
the nature of the regime and the nature of the question of law at issue, the standard was reasonable-
ness.
42. Supra note 13.
43. See below, Reviewing the Exercise of Discretion.
44. Supra note 13 at paras. 119-57. Binnie J. held, at para. 156, that the reasonableness standard applied
because the adjudicator was interpreting his "home turf" statutory framework and there was a priva-
tive clause.
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is a full statutory right of appeal.4 5 Moreover, Justice Deschamps 46 emphasized that
the nature of the question before the administrative tribunal needed to be identified
(i.e. question of law, mixed fact and law, or fact) and was of the view that little else
needed to be done in order to determine whether deference needed to be shown.
47
Deference, therefore, is not owed on a question of law where there is a statutory right
of appeal.
48
In an early post-Dunsmuir49 appeal from the Board, Darragh v. Normar Developments
Inc.,50 the court found that the standard of review remained a correctness standard
and that Dunsmuir51 had no impact in the case.52 The court characterized the issue
on appeal as a "pure question of law, specifically the issue of retroactivity and retro-
spectivity of legislation, and determined that the Board had no special expertise,
relative to the court, to determine such an issue. 53 Given the issues as framed in
Darragh,54 it is argued that the court applied the proper standard and, moreover,
would have reached an identical result under the former pragmatic and functional
approach.
The Dunsmuir5 5 standard of review analysis raised objections from Justice Binnie,
who voiced concern that the waters would remain muddy by merely shifting the
debate from choosing between two standards of reasonableness to a debate within
the single reasonableness standard.56 However, early indications from the Ontario
Court of Appeal, at least, are encouraging. In Mills v. Ontario (Workplace Safety
and Insurance Appeals Tribunal),57 the court held that it was inappropriate to assess
45. Ibid. at para. 123. Binnie J. opined, at para. 124, that the correctness standard should be applied to ques-
tions concerning the constitution, the common law and the interpretation of a statute other than the
administrator's "home statute" or a rule or statute closely connected to it.
46. Ibid. per Deschamps J. at paras. 158-73.
47. Ibid. at para. 158. Deschamps J. noted at para. 160: "By focusing on the 'nature of the question' ... it will
become apparent that all four factors need not be considered in every case and that the judicial review
of administrative action is often not distinguishable from the appellate review of court decisions' De-
schamps J. concluded that, at para. 168, the correctness standard applied because the common law, not
the adjudicator's enabling statute, was the starting point of the analysis and because the adjudicator did
not have expertise in interpreting the common law there could be no deference.
48. Ibid. at para. 163.
49. Supra note 13.
50. [2008] O.J. No. 2586 (Div. Ct.) [Darragh].
51. Supra note 13.
52. Supra note 50 at paras. 12-15.
53. Ibid. at para. 15.
54. Supra note 50.
55. Supra note 13.
56. Ibid. at paras. 150-55.
57. (2008),237 O.A.C. 71 (C.A.)
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varying degrees of deference within the single reasonableness standard.5 8 Yet some
commentators have expressed skepticism about whether the new standard of review
analysis has really changed the degrees of deference at all and that the standard of
patent unreasonableness has not been eliminated but only driven underground.5 9 It
remains to be seen whether it will be appropriate to apply the reasonableness stan-
dard more deferentially or less deferentially, depending on the circumstances.
The Standard of Review Applicable to the Board
The respective roles of the courts and the legislature in establishing the standard of
review in statutory appeals has been described by David Mullan as creating "at least
superficially the potential for a clash between the legislative objective in the express
conferral of a right of access to the courts and judicial assessment of the respective
competence of decision-makers and courts "'6 This clash is more apparent than real,
as there is no persuasive basis for judicial deference on any question of law raised on
appeal. The appropriate standard to be applied to the Board is correctness, as all four
factors point to granting the Board little, if any, deference.
Several residential tenancy decisions have applied the pragmatic and functional ap-
proach, albeit not usually in a comprehensive manner.61 A notable exception is Sage
v. Corporation of the County of Wellington,62 where the court conducted a relatively
detailed review of the four factors. 63 In Sage,64 the issue was whether the Ontario
Rental Housing Tribunal erred in its interpretation of section 84(2)(a) of the Tenant
Protection Act, which required the Tribunal to refuse an eviction application where
the landlord was in serious breach of its responsibilities. In an implicit recognition of
58. Ibid. at para. 18. In Ryan, supra note 22, at para. 20, it was also noted that the standard of reasonable-
ness does not "float" according to the circumstances but always involves asking the same question
about the challenged decision.
59. See Ronald Lunau, "Dunsmuir Preserves 'Patent Unreasonableness' but Drives It Underground" The
Lawyers Weekly 28:16 (29 August 2008); and Gerard Chouest, "SCC Reviews Standard of Review" Bar-
Ex News (13 May 2008).
60. David J. Mullan, "Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity?" 17 Can. J. Ad-
min. L. & Prac. 59 at 94-95.
61. In Toronto Community Housing Corporation v. Greaves, [2004] O.J. No. 5112 (Div. Ct. [Greaves] the
court provided an overview of the recent case law on the standard of review in the RTA context but
did not actually determine which standard was applicable. More recently, in Capano v. Smith, [2007]
O.. No. 5074 (Div. Ct.) [Capano], the Court considered a landlord's appeal of an order that refused an
eviction and awarded no damages in an eviction application for the tenant's interference with reason-
able enjoyment and undue damage to the premises. In determining the standard of review, the court
observed, at paras. 12-14, that there was authority for different standards of review depending on the
nature of the question, both correctness and patent unreasonableness. No reference was made to Paul
Bunyan, supra note 8, and the standard of reasonableness.
62. [2005] O.J. No. 5727 (Div. Ct.) [Sage].
63. Ibid. at paras. 11-21.
64. Ibid. note 62.
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the Tribunal's lack of expertise, the court applied a correctness standard despite the
issue being a matter of the statutory interpretation of the Tribunal's enabling statute.
In addition, it is important to note that multiple standards of review may be applied
in an appeal where multiple questions of law are raised. In 626114 Ontario Ltd. v.
Tirado,65 the court held that the question of the interest payable on the tenant's last
month's rent deposit involved the interpretation of a statutory provision and was a
question of law. Thus, the standard was correctness. 66 However, with respect to the
second issue-the exercise of discretion under section 84(1) of the TPA67-the court
held that this matter involved a question of mixed fact and law and was therefore not
subject to appeal but that, if it was subject to review, then the standard of review was
patent unreasonableness. 68 We now turn to a detailed examination of the four factors
in the standard of review analysis.
Right of Appeal
While the RTA contains a privative clause, the clause is applicable only with respect
to applications for judicial review-a rare occurrence in residential tenancy law,69 as
the RTA explicitly mandates judicial supervision by providing for a right of appeal.
In addition, the Divisional Court has broad appellate powers, including the power
to substitute its decision for that of the Board.70 In Sage,71 the court noted that the
TPA provided a statutory right of appeal and granted broad powers in relation to an
error on a question of law.72 This factor clearly points to showing the Board little, if
any, deference.
Nature of the Question
In assessing the appropriate degree of deference, a critical factor to consider is the
nature of the question before the Board and, specifically, whether the issue under
65. [2005] O.J. No. 4350 (Div. Ct.) [Tirado].
66. Ibid. at para. 5.
67. Supra note 3. Section 84(1) provided:
Upon an application for an order evicting a tenant, the Board may, despite any other provision of
this Act or the tenancy agreement,
(a) refuse to grant the application unless satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that it
would be unfair to refuse; or
(b) order that the enforcement of the eviction order be postponed for a period of time.
68. Supra note 65, at paras. 14, 15. The issue of relief from eviction and the review of discretionary deci-
sions is dealt with in Review of Exercise of Discretion.
69. Section 209(1) of the RTA provides: Except where this Act provides otherwise, and subject to section 21.2
of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, an order of the Board is final and binding. See supra note 17.
70. Section 210(4) provides: If an appeal is brought under this section, the Divisional Court shall hear and
determine the appeal and may,
(a) affirm, rescind, amend or replace the decision or order; or
(b) remit the matter to the Board with the opinion of the Divisional Court.
71. Supranote62.
72. Ibid. at paras. 13-14.
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appeal can be classified as a question of law. The nature of the question may be char-
acterized broadly (i.e. question of law, question of mixed fact and law, or question
of fact) but once it is determined that there is a question of law, the next stage is to
determine what species of question of law is under review. For example, is it a ques-
tion of jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, exercise of discretion, or natural justice
and procedural fairness?
7 3
The nature of the question as one of law demands little deference to the Board. Thus,
the inquiry becomes whether there are types of questions of law where a court might
be inclined to respect the Board's expertise. Arguably, the exercise of discretion is one
such question of law and, as a general proposition, an unreasonable exercise of dis-
cretion should not be permitted to stand. In addition, where the Board is interpreting
its enabling or home statute, the RTA, it could be contended that deference should be
accorded.74 The fundamental issue is whether the Board has a level of specialization
and expertise that ought to be respected by the court and, if so, whether the specific
question of law may be seen as an area where deference should be accorded.75
It is argued here, however, that once a question of law is identified, there are no
grounds for deference by the court. As is discussed below, there is no basis to con-
sider the Board to be an expert tribunal. Moreover, with respect to the review of the
exercise of discretion, this matter is more accurately characterized as a question of
mixed fact and law, unless the court can extract a legal principle as, for example, the
Board's failure to consider a relevant factor. This factor also points to little deference
being accorded by the court.
Purpose of the RTA
The purposes of the RTA are set out in section 1:76
The purposes of this Act are to provide protection for residential tenants from unlawful rent
increases and unlawful evictions, to establish a framework for the regulation of residential
rents, to balance the rights and responsibilities of residential landlords and tenants and
to provide for the adjudication of disputes and for other processes to informally resolve
disputes.
In Sage,77 with respect to the purpose of the legislation as a whole and the specific
provision under review, the court noted:
73. For a counter to this argument, see Rapsey, supra note 17 at 3.
74. Supra note 13, at para. 54.
75. In Jacob Catalytic Ltd. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 353 (2008), 91 O.R. (3d)
20 at paras. 36-39 (Div. Ct.) [Jacob Catalytic] the majority of the court found that the Ontario Labour
Relations Board [OLRB] deserved deference on both the interpretation and application of the OLRB's
enabling statute, the Labour Relations Act 1995, and with respect to the application of the common law
principles of the doctrine of estoppel.
76. No purpose section was included in the TPA or the LTA, supra note 3.
77. Supra note 62.
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The TPA sets out the rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants and provides a
mechanism for the resolution of disputes. The purpose of s. 84(2) is straightforward and
precludes an order for eviction if the landlord is in serious breach of her or his duties under
the TPA. The section limits the ability of landlords to evict tenants if they are in serious
breach of their obligations under the Act or the lease.
78
The general purpose of the RTA is the resolution of disputes and the determina-
tion of rights between the parties by the Board. In this respect the Board's basic role
is similar to that of the courts. In short, the Board is not in the business of policy
development but is essentially an adjudicative body. The Board is not called upon
to determine issues that involve balancing the benefits and costs for many different
parties or what has been described as "polycentric" issues.79 This factor also points
to less deference by the courts.
Area of the Board's Expertise
Expertise has been described as the most important of the factors used to determine
the standard of review 80 and can relate to questions of law, mixed fact and law, or fact
alone.81 Assessing the Board's expertise involves a judicial inquiry into the Board's
competence to address the specific issue under review. As noted by the Supreme
Court:
Greater deference will be called for only where the decision-making body is, in some way,
more expert than the Courts and the question under consideration is one that falls within
the scope of this greater expertise.
82
There ought to be no presumption that the legislative choice of the Board to deal with
residential tenancy disputes constitutes even an implied recognition of the Board's
expertise on any question of law.83 In assessing the relative expertise of the Board,
the courts must:
1. characterize the expertise of the tribunal;
2. consider its own expertise relative to that of the tribunal; and
3. identify the nature of the specific issue before the tribunal relative to their
expertise.
84
78. Ibid. at para. 20.
79. Pushpanathan, supra note 21 at para. 36.
80. Southam, supra note 8 at para. 50.
81. Dr. Q., supra note 4 at para. 29.
82. Ibid. at para. 28.
83. See Rapsey, supra note 17 at 7 for a critique of Paul Bunyan, supra note 8, where the court suggested
that the ORHT was an expert tribunal because it was established "presumably because the government
of Ontario believed this task could be handled more effectively and efficiently by a panel of lay persons
with expertise in this field'
84. Dr. Q., supra note 4 at para. 28 [citing Pushpanathan, supra note 21 at para. 33].
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In Sage,85 the court found that the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal was a special-
ized tribunal but that the ORHT did not have specialized expertise in health or en-
vironmental law:
The ORHT is a specialized tribunal concerning landlord tenant matters. The subject-matter
of the appeal is a question of law. The Tribunal did not consider legislative enactments or
provincial standards to determine whether the landlord's failure to provide potable water
or repair the well was a serious breach of the Act or the tenancy agreement. The governing
standards for potable water are not found in the TPA and the Tribunal does not have the
expertise in the area of health or environmental law. The Court is in as good or better
position than the Tribunal to examine these standards and apply them to correctly interpret
the term serious breach.
86
In MacNeil v. 976445 Ontario Ltd.,87 the Court also found the Tribunal to be a "spe-
cialized tribunal concerning landlord and tenant matters" 88 However, the court did
not go on to identify whether the Tribunal had greater expertise than the courts on
the issues raised in the case, i.e. the correct legal test to determine the standard of
"serious breach" in section 84(2) of the TPA.
It is suggested, nevertheless, that the Board is not an "expert" tribunal in the sense this
term has been used by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that a tribunal
similar to the Board, under a statute similar to the RTA, was not an expert tribunal. 89
The court found that the former Ontario Residential Tenancies Commission was not
a specialized tribunal and therefore was not entitled to broad curial deference be-
cause there was no requirement that its members have legal training or occupational
experience and the process of selection of members was not based on any bipartite
or tripartite principle. 90 Moreover, the Board has no specialized expertise, such as
economic, technical, or scientific knowledge that would call upon an expertise not
available to a court. Clearly, the Board is not a highly specialized expert tribunal in
the same sense as a provincial Securities Commission,91 the federal Competition
Tribunal,92 a provincial Labour Relations Board,93 or a provincial Judicial Institute.
94
85. Supra note 62.
86. Ibid. atparas. 18-19.
87. [2005] O.J. No. 6362 (Div. Ct.). Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was denied: MacNeil v. 976445
Ontario Ltd. (27 September 2005), Court File No. M32654 (Ont. C.A.)
88. Ibid. at paras. 20, 21.
89. Reference re Residential Tenancies Act 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714.
90. Ibid. at 748. This remains the case with respect to Board Members.
91. Pezim, supra note 17.
92. Southam, supra note 8.
93. Jacob, supra note 75.
94. Moreau-Bgrub, supra note 21.
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Thus, it is not crucial to determine whether the question of law at issue falls within the
Board's expertise, as the Board maintains no specialized expertise on any question of
law, including the interpretation of the RTA. As noted in Southam,95 the reasonable-
ness standard is, at root, deference to expertise, and courts should give considerable
weight to tribunals about matters on which they have "significant expertise".96 It is
difficult to envision where an appellate court might encounter difficulties in under-
standing the ramifications of a Board decision, in stark contrast to, for example, the
economic and commercial ramifications of the federal Competition Tribunal's deci-
sions, where the Supreme Court observed that there was a "natural inference" that
the purpose of the Competition Tribunal Act 97 would be better served by deference to
the Tribunal's decisions. 98 A court should not, therefore, grant the Board any defer-
ence with respect to the final factor of relative expertise in the standard of review
analysis.
Conclusion on Standard of Review at the Board
Given the statutory right of appeal, the broad appellate powers to replace, rescind,
or affirm a Board decision and the Board's relative lack of specialized expertise on
any question of law, much turns on the characterization of the question on appeal.
A question of law should attract no deference from the court-the standard of cor-
rectness should be applied. However, on some questions of law (i.e. the exercise of
statutory discretion) a different "standard of review" or test may be applicable, while
other questions of law (i.e. natural justice and procedural fairness) may require a dif-
ferent approach, one similar to review on the correctness standard, as the courts do
not apply a standard of review analysis to these types of questions of law.
It has been observed that anything less than a correctness standard implies that a
non-expert Board would be permitted to make errors of law99 and that it is only on
applications for judicial review, where questions of fact and questions of mixed fact
and law may be raised, that there may be a consideration of standards of review other
than correctness. 100 However, the application of a reasonableness standard is not
contingent on the nature of the question under review, but rather on the application
of the RTA's privative clause in applications for judicial review. Both appellate and
95. Supra note 8.
96. Ibid. at para. 62.
97. R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.)
98. Supra note 8 at para. 49. See also Flora v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan, General Manager), (2008)
91 O.R. (3d) 412 at paras. 40-41(Ont. C.A.) where the court, per Cronk J.A., held that the standard of
review was reasonableness on a statutory appeal to the Health Services and Appeal Board. Despite the
existence of a broad right of appeal, the court found that the Board had an "understanding of medi-
cine, an area in which the court could not claim any greater expertise, and that the Board was engaged
in interpreting its enabling statute and not any matter of general law outside the Board's specialized
expertise.
99. Rapsey, supra note 17 at 4-5.
100. Ibid. at 10-11.
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judicial review exist to correct legal error by inferior tribunals, each is governed by
the same four factors in the standard of review analysis and each applies the same
standards to questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law. The crucial dis-
tinction is that, in judicial review, a court must be cognizant of the privative clause
that signals some deference is to be accorded to the Board. A standard of reasonable-
ness may be more probable in an application for judicial review but much would turn
on the nature of the question of law under review and the characterization of the
legal error-a task that can result in conflicting interpretations from the courts. It is
to this issue that we now turn.
REVIEWING QUESTIONS OF LAW
Questions of law are questions about what the correct legal test is.
101
Questions before the courts have consistently been identified as either questions of
fact, questions of law, or questions of mixed fact and law. Any appellate review starts
with such an identification process which is, of course, of central importance on ap-
peals from the Board. What, therefore, may be classified as a "question of law', and is
the category broader than merely delineating the "correct legal test"? As will be seen,
there is debate about what may constitute a question of law and what type of question
of law has been raised.
Classifying a Question of Law
On appellate review from the Board, the characterization of the error is of critical
importance. The right of appeal is permissible "only on a question of law" under
the RTA. The threshold issue for the reviewing court is to determine whether the
grounds of appeal from a decision of the Board identify a question of law in order to
vest the court with its appellate jurisdiction. In many cases, the dispute as to whether
an appeal raises a question of law is raised on motions to quash an appeal where the
moving party portrays the appeal as one devoid of merit and involving questions of
fact or of mixed fact and law rather than of law alone. 10 2
In most appeals from the Board there is no substantive dispute as to the existence
of a question of law as with, for example, issues of statutory interpretation 10 3 and
101. Southam, supra note 8, per lacobucci J. at para. 35.
102. See O'Regan v. Commvesco Levinson-Viner Group, [2006] O.1. No. 3528 (Div. Ct.) [O'Regan]; Martino
v. Mohammad (2006), 214 O.A.C. 221 (Div. Ct.); and Toronto Community Housing Corporation v. Jilks,
[2008] O.J. No. 2774 (Div. Ct.).
103. Issues of statutory interpretation have been found to be questions of law alone. See Briarlane Property
Management Inc. v. Bradt (2004), 185 O.A.C. 198 (Div. Ct.); Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Park
(2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 789 (Div. Ct.); Luray Investments Ltd. v. Recine-Pynn (1999), 126 O.A.C 303 (Div.
Ct.); and Krafczek v. 1320239 Ontario Ltd., [2002] OJ. No. 2091 (Div. Ct.).
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jurisdiction. 10 4 But questions of law are not confined to simply determining what
the correct legal test may be. Issues of natural justice and procedural fairness' 0 5 are
properly characterized as questions of law10 6 but do not involve the determination
of a legal test. Furthermore, the issue of what constitutes a "question of law" is not al-
ways self-evident or straightforward. In Sheldrick v. Ontario (Ministry of Community
and Social Services),10 7 a case concerning eligibility for disability income support,
two appellate courts comprising six justices differed on whether the Social Benefits
Tribunal [SBT] had erred in law in its treatment of the evidence and its fact-finding
process. The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court committed reversible
error by incorrectly characterizing the SBT decision as including an error of law.
In a brief endorsement, it held that the Divisional Court was in substance simply
disagreeing with the SBT's weighing of the evidence 0 8 and that the SBT had fulfilled
its role in the consideration and weighing of the evidence and provided sufficient
reasons. The Divisional Court, in contrast, found that the SBT had disregarded and
failed to appreciate relevant uncontradicted medical evidence, specifically from two
expert witnesses, without adequate explanation and had thereby erred in law.
109
In other words, the Divisional Court was of the view that the SBT had considered
but failed to appreciate the medical evidence, whereas the Court of Appeal was of
the view that that the medical evidence was both considered and appreciated and
that the Divisional Court was essentially not satisfied with the SBT's treatment of
the evidence and inappropriately substituted its own view of the weight that should
have been accorded to the evidence. 110 The Court of Appeal found that there was
no error in the SBT's fact-finding process and, alternatively, could have analyzed the
SBT decision by applying the "palpable and overriding error" test regularly applied
to findings of fact. 111 Using either approach, it is suggested that the Court of Appeal
would have determined that no question of law was raised.
104. Jurisdictional issues have also been found to be errors of law alone. See Duong v. Ratia, [2002] O.J. No.
1758 (Div. Ct.); Humby v. Naccarato, [2001] O.J. No. 362 (Div. Ct.); Ball v. Metro Capital Management
(2002), O.J. No. 1747 (Div. Ct.); Nesha v. Bezrukova, [2003] O.J. No. 3787 (Div. Ct.); and Kissell v. Radak
Milsosevic and VRM Investments Ltd., [2008] O.J. No. 2244 (Div. Ct.).
105. Matters related to natural justice have been found to be questions of law alone. See Kizemchuk v. Kizem-
chuk, [2000] O.J. No. 2763 (Div. Ct.); 60 Montclair Ltd. v. Kizemchuk, [2002] O.J. No. 2283 (Div. Ct.);
Klein v. Cohen (2001), 143 O.A.C. 342 (Div. Ct.); Kuzyk v. SKProperties, [2001] O.J. No. 5260 (Div. Ct.);
and Montgomery and Turgeon v. 737259 Ontario Limited (15 October 1999), Court File No. 1031 (Ont.
Div. Ct.-London).
106. They are frequently characterized as errors of jurisdiction.
107. [2007] O.J. No. 2504 (C.A.).
108. Ibid. at para. 1.
109. [2007] O.J. No. 1276 (Div. Ct.) at para. 5.
110. The author's review of the SBT decision, Sheldrick v. Director (Disability Adjudication Unit) (26 August
2004; Foster) File No. 0307-05797 (SBT) at 4-5, indicates that the SBT, in the author's view, did make
reference to and did consider the expert evidence of the family doctor and the psychologist.
111. See below, Reviewing Questions of Fact.
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Furthermore, even where there is agreement that a question of law exists, there may
be disagreement about what type of question of law exists and this can affect the
standard of review analysis. In Dunsmuir, 112 all nine justices agreed that a question
of law was raised but six justices applied a reasonableness standard and three justices
applied a correctness standard. While a majority of the court viewed the legal ques-
tion as one of statutory interpretation of the adjudicator's statutory framework,
113
the minority viewed the issue as one of common law and concluded that, as the
adjudicator did not have specific expertise in interpreting the common law, the ap-
plicable standard was correctness.
114
Standard of Review on Questions of Law
In Housen v. Nikolaisen,115 the Supreme Court held that the standard of review of
a trial court, on a "pure question of law" was correctness, primarily because of the
duty of an appellate court to establish legal rules required a broad scope of review. 116
An appellate court conducts an identical role with administrative tribunals, includ-
ing the Board, and there is no basis for the application of a reasonableness standard
to questions of law, even where the tribunal is recognized as a highly specialized
expert body. 117 This is so because of, as set out in Housen,118 two related underlying
policy considerations: the principle of universality, which requires appellate courts to
ensure that the same legal rules are applied in similar situations, and the recognized
law-making role of appellate courts.
119
A reasonableness standard means that conflicting interpretations of questions of law
may be upheld by the courts where both are reasonable. 120 As noted in Dunsmuir, 121
the reviewing court must recognize that tribunals have a margin of appreciation
112. Supra note 13.
113. Ibid. at paras. 72-76, per Bastarache and LeBel JJ.; at para. 156 per Binnie J.
114. Ibid. at para. 168, per Deschamps J. Moreover, to further complicate the classification of questions of
law, there is the issue of distinguishing between general questions of law that may have precendential
effect or the potential to apply widely to many cases ("pure questions of law"), subject to a correctness
standard, and those questions of law that are so particular as to not have any precedential value and
within the specialized expertise of the administrative tribunal, subject to a reasonableness standard.
See Mullan, supra note 60 at 74-77, for a discussion of the Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.
115. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.
116. Ibid. at para 9 per Iacobucci and Major JJ.
117. See Jacob Catalytic, supra note 75 at para. 29. With respect to the OLRB and the application of the com-
mon law doctrine of estoppel, the court's view was that the application of the doctrine raised questions
of mixed fact and law but recognized that the "Board and labour arbitrators have a long history of ap-
plying this doctrine when adjudicating grievances'
118. Supra note 115.
119. Ibid. at para. 9.
120. Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d'appel en matiire de lisions professionnelles), [1993] S.C.J. No. 75.
121. Supra note 13.
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within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. 122 Certain questions of law
may attract a correctness standard, 123 but where the legal question is not one of
central importance to the legal system or is within the specialized expertise of the
tribunal, 124 a standard of reasonableness may apply.
The applicability of a reasonableness standard on questions of law at the Board has
been criticized as being unacceptable in housing law, as appeal decisions would have
no binding precedential standing on the interpretation of the RTA. 125 It is argued
here, however, that on questions of law the Board must be correct in its decision
on the basis that it is not a highly specialized, expert tribunal to be accorded any
deference as to, for example, its interpretation of the RTA. There is no question of
law, including the statutory interpretation of its "home" statute, on which the Board
can be presumed to possess a greater ability in determining relative to the courts. To
adopt the words of McLachlin C.J.C. in Dr. Q.,126 the Board has no "topical expertise"
and is not "adept in the determination of particular issues " 127 Although the exercise
of assessing expertise has been described as depending on a combination of fac-
tors, primarily involving conjecture and not scientific inquiry by the courts, 128 it is
equally true that the RTA bestows a statutory right of appeal. As such, an appellate
court should always conduct a correctness review, unless the question of law is one
that is classified as falling within a tribunal's core expertise.
129
We now turn to an examination of the area of questions of mixed fact and law and,
in particular, how a question of law may be extracted where it is determined that an
incorrect legal test or standard has been applied.
REVIEWING QUESTIONS OF MIXED FACT AND LAW
Questions of mixed law and fact are questions about whether the facts satisfy the legal
tests. 
130
Where the application of the facts to the law is the alleged error of law, a court is
generally inclined to characterize the question as one of mixed fact and law. Under
the RTA, questions of mixed fact and law are not subject to appeal because they are,
122. Ibid. at para. 47, per Bastarache and LeBel JJ.
123. Ibid. at paras. 58-61.
124. Ibid. at para. 70.
125. Rapsey, supra note 17 at 9. This comment was made in context of the TPA but is equally applicable to
the RTA.
126. Supra note 4.
127. Ibid. at para. 28.
128. Mullan, supra note 60 at 71.
129. Ibid. at 72. A reasonableness standard was applied in the context of a statutory appeal in both Southam,
supra note 8 and Pezim, supra note 17. It is suggested that this was because of the Court's willingness to
show deference to the tribunals' relative expertise in highly specialized fields.
130. Supra note 4 at para. 35.
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by definition, not questions of law alone. The Board's duty is to consider and weigh
the evidence, make findings of fact and to apply those facts to the relevant law. The
question becomes whether the "relevant law" has been correctly applied.
Defining a Question of Mixed Fact and Law
A number of appellate decisions have dismissed appeals on the basis that a question
of mixed fact and law has been raised, frequently in the context of eviction applica-
tions for own use possession by the landlord.13' In Meredith v. Leboeuf Properties
Inc.,132 the court conducted the question of law threshold inquiry very strictly. The
tenant alleged that the Tribunal erred in failing to exercise its mandatory authority
to refuse the eviction under section 84(2)(a) of the TPA where the landlord was in
serious breach of its obligations. The court denied the appeal as it did not involve
a question of law alone, holding that a determination as to whether there was any
evidence was a question of law, and what inferences could or should be drawn from
some evidence was at best a question of mixed fact and law.
133
In Jemiolo v. Firchuk,134 the court similarly found that no question of law was raised
in an appeal challenging the Tribunal's fact-finding process. The issue was whether
the appellant was a "tenant" within the meaning of the TPA. The court held that the
standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation was correctness and that
"tenant" was a defined term under the TPA. 135 The tenant argued that the Tribunal
failed to properly consider the evidence of the appellant and the evidence of the con-
duct of the landlords' agents. The court stated:
131. Section 48 RTA, supra note 2. See Liu v. Chen, [2004] O.J. No. 3965 (Div. Ct.), where the court held
that the issue of good faith in a landlord's own use eviction application was at best a question of mixed
fact and law, and was not subject to appeal; Emerson v. Themer, [2007] O.J. No. 3662 (Div. Ct.) at paras.
1-3 (Div. Ct.) where the court held that the issue regarding bad faith was a question of fact or at best a
question of mixed fact and law and was not reviewable by the court; and Bakardjiev v. MacLean (10 July
2006) Court File No. 244/05 at para. 2 (Div. Ct.) (leave to Court of Appeal refused 15 January 2007 and
leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 127), in which the court held
that determining good faith for the purpose of residential occupancy was a question of fact and not a
question of law alone.
132. [2000] O.J. No. 209 (Div. Ct.).
133. Ibid. at para. 3.
134. (2005) Court File No. 577/04 (Div. Ct.).
135. Ibid. at para 5. See also North York General Hospital, supra note 31 at para. 23, where the court had
serious reservations about whether a determination that the residents were "owners" of their dwellings
for the purposes of the TPA was a question of law alone, since it required an investigation of the factual
underpinnings of the relationship. However, because of the blurred distinction between questions of
law alone and questions of mixed fact and law, the possibility of error in making that determination,
and the fact that there were other questions of pure law raised in the appeal, the court dealt with the
merits of the appeal.
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The factual findings of the Tribunal are not subject to review. Whether or not there is any
evidence is a question of law. What inferences can or should be drawn from some evidence is
at best a question of mixed fact and law... Our jurisdiction is limited to questions of law.
136
It would be more accurate, however, to state that factual findings of the Board are
subject to review but these findings will be disturbed only where the error of fact is
sufficiently serious. 137 Where there is some evidence to support the factual findings,
the court will not intervene. In Jemiolo, 138 the Tribunal's findings that the appellant
was not a tenant and that there was no tenancy agreement were supported by some
evidence. The Tribunal, in the court's view, was therefore correct to conclude that
there was no implied tenancy agreement. 1
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Standard of Review of Questions of Mixed Fact and Law
In Housen, 14 it was recognized that determining the applicable standard of review
was a difficult exercise. 14 1 Questions of mixed fact and law (i.e. applying a legal stan-
dard to a set of facts) lie along a spectrum. Questions of mixed fact and law are
questions where the legal and factual issues are intertwined and cannot easily be
separated. The court did not therefore articulate a distinct standard for all questions
of mixed fact and law:
Where the trier of fact has considered all of the evidence that the law requires him or her to
consider and still comes to the wrong conclusion, then this amounts to an error of mixed
fact and law and is subject to a more stringent standard of review [than for findings of fact]:
[citation omitted]. 
142
The question for the reviewing court is whether a legal principle is readily extricable
from the factual. 143 If it is not, then it is a question of mixed fact and law "subject
to a more stringent standard" 144 If a legal principle may be extracted, then it may
constitute an error in law and be subject to a correctness standard.
136. Ibid. at para 12 [emphasis added].
137. Below, Reviewing Questions of Fact.
138. Supra note 107.
139. Ibid. at para 13. For a different result, see Bielak v. Clarke, [2003] O.J. No. 4479 (Div. Ct.), where the
Tribunal found that the landlord's daughter's desire to occupy the unit was genuine and granted the
eviction application. The court found that the Tribunal erred in finding good faith, having failed to
weigh and address the evidence of bad faith. Although the issue of good faith is regularly character-
ized as a question of mixed fact and law, the court extricated a question of law: did the Tribunal fail to
consider evidence? In short, the fact-finding process was flawed.
140. Supra note 115.
141. Ibid. at para. 27.
142. Ibid. at para 28.
143. Ibid. at para 36.
144. Ibid. at para 36: "The general rule ... is that, where the issue on appeal involves the trial judge's in-
terpretation of the evidence as a whole, it should not be overturned absent palpable and overriding
error".
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Arguably, a question of law may be extracted from both the Board's characterization
of a legal test or standard and from its factual findings. If no error in law may be ex-
tracted from either area, then the question falls into the middle of the spectrum and
may be classified as a question of mixed fact and law and, with respect to the Board,
beyond the scope of appellate review.
Extracting a Question of Law from a Legal Standard
The application of a legal test or standard to a factual situation requires an analysis
of both law and fact and, to that extent, is a question of mixed fact and law. The
exercise of extracting a question of law from a question of mixed fact and law raises
two distinct lines of inquiry: is there a factual dispute (i.e. are the facts as found sup-
ported by the evidence?) or is there a dispute about the legal test to be applied (i.e.
what is the content of the legal test?)? In Housen, 145 the Supreme Court discussed,
in the context of a negligence action, the task of extricating a question of law from a
question of mixed fact and law:
To summarize, a finding of negligence by a trial judge involves applying a legal standard
to a set of facts, and thus is a question of mixed fact and law. Matters of mixed fact and law
lie along a spectrum. Where, for instance, an error with respect to a finding of negligence
can be attributed to the application of an incorrect standard, a failure to consider a required
element of a legal test, or similar error in principle, such an error can be characterized as an
error of law, subject to a standard of correctness. Appellate courts must be cautious, however,
in finding that a trial judge erred in law in his or her determination of negligence, as it is
often difficult to extricate the legal questions from the factual. It is for this reason that these
matters are referred to as questions of "mixed law and fact.' Where the legal principle is not
readily extricable, then the matter is one of "mixed law and fact" and is subject to a more
stringent standard. 
1 4 6
Thus, whether the facts, once established, satisfy the legal test is a question of mixed
fact and law. But the identification of the content of the legal test itself is a question
of law. As noted in Dunsmuir, 147 questions of mixed fact and law vary-is this a
question of identifying the "contours and the content of a legal rule" or is this a mat-
ter of simply applying an established rule to a set of facts?
148
In Housen,149 it was observed that both questions of mixed fact and law and factual
findings often involve drawing inferences and that the difference between the two
questions lies in whether the inference drawn is legal or factual. 1
50
145. Supra note 115.
146. Ibid. at para. 36 [emphasis added] per lacobucci and Major II.
147. Supra note 13.
148. Ibid. at paras. 161-64per Deschamps J.
149. Supra note 115.
150. Ibid. at para. 26.
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We are supported in our conclusion by the analogy which can be drawn between inferences
of fact and questions of mixed fact and law. As stated above, both involve drawing infer-
ences from underlying facts. The difference lies in whether the inference drawn relates to
a legal standard or not. Because both processes are intertwined with the weight assigned to
the evidence, the numerous policy reasons which support a deferential stance to the trial
judge's inferences of fact, also, to a certain extent, support showing deference to the trial
judge's inferences of mixed fact and law.
Where, however, an erroneous finding of the trial judge can be traced to an error in his or
her characterization of the legal standard, then this encroaches on the law-making role of
an appellate court, and less deference is required, consistent with a "correctness" standard of
review. 151
In short, where a question of mixed fact and law can be isolated and attributed to the
application of an incorrect standard, such as the failure to consider a required ele-
ment of a legal test, it is an error of law subject to a correctness standard.
152 Housen 15 3
offers the following example:
In Southam ... this Court illustrated how an error on a question of mixed fact and law can
amount to a pure error of law subject to the correctness standard:
... if a decision-maker says that the correct test requires him or her to consider A, B,
C, and D, but in fact the decision-maker considers only A, B, and C, then the outcome
is as if he or she had applied a law that required consideration of only A, B, and C. If
the correct test requires him or her to consider D as well, then the decision-maker has
in effect applied the wrong law, and so has made an error of law.
Therefore, what appears to be a utestion of mixed fact and law, upon further reflection, can
actually be an error of pure law.
4
A review of recent appellate jurisprudence considering section 84(2)(a) of the TPA
illustrates the courts' analytical approach to extricating a question of law from what
may appear, at first instance, to be a question of mixed fact and law.
Extracting a Question of Law from a Statutory Standard: "Serious Breach" of a
Landlord's Responsibilities
Section 84(2)(a) of the TPA limits the ability of landlords to evict if they are in
"serious breach" of their responsibilities. In Puterbough v. Canada (Public Works &
Government Services), 155 an appeal of eviction orders under the demolition provi-
sions of the TPA, 15 6 the premises were located on the federal government's site for a
151. Ibid. at paras. 32, 33 [emphasis added].
152. Supra note 8 at paras. 35-42 per Iacobucci J. and supra note 115 at paras. 26-37 per Iacobucci and Major
lJ.
153. Supra note 115.
154. Ibid. at para. 27.
155. [2007] O.J. No. 748 (Div. Ct.) [Puterbough].
156. Section 53 of the TPA, supra note 3.
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proposed airport. The government concluded that demolition of the properties was
the lowest-cost option. 157 In two of the five cases under appeal, 158 the Tribunal held
that the government's breach of its maintenance responsibilities was serious, contra-
vened section 84(2)(a) of the TPA, 15 9 and refused an eviction order.
With regard to the Beelby appeal, the Tribunal found as fact that:
1. in the past, the landlord had spent less on maintenance then what the land-
lord acknowledged was reasonable;
2. the premises were in poor condition (mould, rotting kitchen countertop,
deteriorated walkway/driveway and garage); and
3. major expenditures were necessary to be able to continue to use the prem-
ises as residential premises. 1
60
Applying these facts to the statutory standard in section 84(2)(a), the Tribunal found
that the landlord breached its section 24(1) obligation 16' and the breach was ser-
ious.162 On appeal, the court found the Tribunal had engaged in "improper reason-
ing" in concluding that these facts constituted a serious breach. 163
The court characterized the issue as one of statutory interpretation, specifically the
meaning of the term "serious breach" of the landlord's responsibilities in section 84(2)
(a). Adopting a "pragmatic, balanced and contextual approach, the court determined
that the focus had to be on the seriousness of the breach as opposed to the seriousness
of the defect or deficiency. 164 In short, a serious breach was not established merely by
the premises being in need of significant or extensive repairs. 165 The seriousness of
the defect was but one factor to consider. The court adopted the approach taken in
the Tribunal's Guideline 7:166
157. Supra note 155 at para. 32. Demolition would have cost $12,000 while repairs and upgrades would have
cost $54,300.
158. The appellants Beelby and McKay. There were five appellants consolidated into the appeal: Puter-
bough, Beelby, McKay, Mogk and Knapp.
159. Section 84(2)(a) of the TPA, supra note 3, provided:
Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), the Board shall refuse to grant the application
where satisfied that,
(a) the landlord is in serious breach of the landlord's responsibilities under this Act or of any
material covenant in the tenancy agreement;
160. Supra note 155 at para. 84.
161. The landlord's statutory obligation to maintain and repair the premises.
162. Supra note 155 at para. 91.
163. Ibid. at para. 106.
164. Ibid. at para. 15.
165. Ibid. at para. 22.
166. Supra note 155 at para. 27.
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The Tribunal considers a variety of factors, such as whether the breach of the duty to repair
has resulted in a health or safety concern, the impact any repair problem has had on the ten-
ant, what actions the landlord has taken to deal with the repair problem, whether the tenant
complained to the landlord about a longstanding repair problem, whether the landlord
was aware of the problem prior to any application being brought, and whether the tenant
contributed to the problem. 1
67
A similar approach to section 84(2)(a) was applied in Sage,168 but a different result
was reached by the court. The tenants argued the landlord was in serious breach
under section 84(2)(a) because he failed to fix the roof and provide a consistent
source of safe water. In concluding that the landlord was not in serious breach, the
Tribunal found the evidence did not show the water was at all times unsafe and the
tenants had resorted to obtaining their own water, which was a matter that the ten-
ants could pursue in their own application.169 On appeal, the court defined the issue
as whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of section 84(2)(a), 170 stating:
The term "serious breach" found in s. 84(2) of the TPA is a statutory standard. The serious-
ness of the breaches by the County is shown by the failure of the water supply to meet the
water quality standards ... that apply throughout the province. I find that the breaches were
on-going for several years, there was a causal connection between the breaches and the con-
taminated well water, the County took no steps to fix the cause of the contamination and
the risk to health and safety were grave. The breaches were serious for the above reasons.
I find that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the word "serious" within the meaning
of s. 84(2) of the TPA and in its reasoning that the breach was not serious because the water
was not "at all times unsafe."
17 1
The court thus considered that (1) the significance of the defect; (2) the length of
time of the defect; (3) the landlord's lack of action; and (4) the degree of risk to health
and safety together constituted a "serious" breach of the landlord's maintenance obli-
gations. Arguably, the court applied the correct legal test insofar as various factors
were considered and not merely the significance of the defect. The court did not,
however, embark on an explicit analysis of the proper test to be applied.
Lastly, in MacNeil v. 976445 Ontario Ltd.,172 the tenants of a mobile home park were
evicted because the landlord wanted to convert the park to non-residential use to
avoid the expense of complying with environmental orders relating to sewage. The
tenants also alleged, in addition to the sewage issue, that the roads were not well
167. Interpretation Guideline 7: Relieffrom Eviction: Refusing or Delaying an Eviction (released 31 January
2007).
168. Supra note 62.
169. Ibid. at para. 9.
170. Ibid. at para. 10.
171. Ibid. at paras. 42, 43.
172. Supra note 87.
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maintained and that the Tribunal failed to properly apply section 84(2)(a).' 73 The
court again characterized the issue as whether the Tribunal had erred in its inter-
pretation of section 84(2) (a) 174 and stated that the "correct legal test to determine the
term 'serious' breach found in section 84(2)(a) was a question of law" 175
The court held that the landlord was not in serious breach of her obligations under
section 110 of the TPA, 176 finding that there was "no evidence to suggest that the
roads were in such poor shape as to be considered a serious breach' 177 The court had
heard no evidence to suggest that the landlord was in serious breach of its obligations
under section 110 regarding the road maintenance. Although there were problems
with the sewage system, the landlord had taken remedial action and a septic system
was currently in place, and remained so except as directed by the municipality. In
addition, the Tribunal determined that the landlord had explored her alternatives to
closure of the park to a reasonable degree, 178 that she had made a business decision
rather than a personal one in deciding to evict all the tenants, and that this decision
was made in good faith. In making this determination, the court had to look at the
intent of the landlord at the time of issuing the termination notices. It was unreason-
able to conclude, in the court's view, that there was motive to evict the entire mobile
home park to retaliate for a dysfunctional relationship with one tenant.
MacNeil, 179 from one perspective, may be considered as a "no evidence" appeal where
the court was concerned chiefly about the lack of evidence relating to the condition
of the roads. In other words, on the evidence, the defect was not significant and the
Tribunal had made a flawed finding of fact. Moreover, even if the road conditions
were a significant defect, following the analysis set out in Puterbough, 180 the defect
would be but one factor to consider in assessing whether there was a serious breach
of the landlord's maintenance obligations.
Puterbough,181 Sage,182 and MacNei1183 demonstrate how a question of law may be
extracted from an apparent question of mixed fact and law and thus subject to ap-
peal under the RTA. Whether the landlord's breach of its responsibilities is "serious"
173. Ibid. at para. 12.
174. Ibid. The Court determined, at para. 23, that the standard of review on appeal of a question of law was
correctness.
175. Ibid. at para. 19.
176. Section 110 of the TPA, supra note 3, sets out the landlord's responsibilities for maintenance and repair
in mobile home parks.
177. Supra note 87 at para. 27.
178. Ibid. at para. 24.
179. Supra note 87.
180. Supra note 155.
181. Ibid.
182. Supra note 62.
183. Supra note 87.
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involves applying the facts to a statutory standard, but where the wrong standard is
applied then the issue becomes a question of law.184 On the other hand, if the correct
legal standard is applied to a set of facts, then the question is likely to be character-
ized as one of mixed fact and law. However, as seen in MacNeil,185 a court may also
review the fact-finding process itself and, for instance, characterize the issue as one
of no evidence or, in other words, as an erroneous finding of fact. It is to that issue
that we now turn.
REVIEWING QUESTIONS OF FACT
Questions of fact ... are questions about what actually took place between the
parties. 1
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Traditionally, appellate courts have applied a principle of deference to the factual
findings of trial courts, emphasizing that courts should not second guess the weight
assigned by the trier of fact to the evidence. 187 The same principle is applicable to
administrative tribunals. As a general rule, the Board's factual determinations will
not be subject to appeal, 188 due to an appellate court's general reluctance to substitute
its own view of the facts for those of the Board.
In order to determine "what actually took place between the parties" the Board must
consider and weigh all of the relevant and admissible evidence before it. Given the
express limitation in the RTA to appeals only on questions of law, it might be con-
tended that all questions of fact are excluded from appellate review. After all, some
statutes do make express reference to the power to appeal or review questions of fact.
For example, the Federal Court Act 189 provides that the court may grant relief if the
decision is based "on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capri-
cious manner or without regard to the material before it" 190 However, it is argued
184. As a question of law, all three decisions found that the applicable standard of review was correctness.
185. Supra note 87.
186. Southam, supra note 8 at para. 35.
187. See Stein v. Kathy K (The Ship), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802 at 808. In Housen, supra note 115 at para. 24, the
majority stated the "essential point is that making a factual conclusion, of any kind, is inextricably
linked with assigning weight to evidence, and thus attracts a deferential standard of review." There
remains some debate, however, about the proper approach to reviewing inferences of fact (see the ma-
jority decision at paras. 22, 23, and the minority decision at paras. 101-103).
188. In the residential tenancy context see Walls v. Bezarevic, [2001] O.J. No. 2041 (Div. Ct.), where the
Court held that a single illegal act could warrant eviction in law but that the issue of weighing the evi-
dence to determine if it should warrant eviction in a particular case was not a legal question.
189. R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 [FCA]. See also sections 6(1)(a) and (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
C.43, which provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal (a), with leave, from an order of the Divi-
sional Court on a question that is not a question of fact alone and (b) from a final order of a judge of
the Superior Court of Justice.
190. FCA, supra note 189, section 18.1(4)(d). Section 42(3) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19
(now repealed), provided that an appeal could be brought "on a question of law or fact or both:
"But Only on a Question of Law" 143
that the express statutory provision is largely irrelevant in defining the scope of the
court's jurisdiction. In essence, statutory language, such as exists in the FCA and
elsewhere, merely articulates the applicable standard of review rather than providing
the jurisdictional basis for the power to review. Findings of fact are susceptible to
appellate review because the fact-finding process may be so flawed as to constitute
reviewable error, regardless of the statute's language.
In order to apply the facts to the law, there must be an accurate determination of the
facts based on the evidence adduced. The law also applies to the fact-finding process
and, as such, may well engage a question of law.191 Questions of fact are reviewable if
they are erroneous findings of fact because those are classified as errors in law. At the
Board, in an appropriate case, what appears to be merely a question of fact (i.e. what
actually took place between the parties) may be transformed into a question of law
as a result of the Board's flawed treatment of the evidence leading to the finding of
fact. The key preliminary issue, however, is what standard of review a court will apply
to the Board's fact-finding determinations. As might be anticipated, a great deal of
deference is given to factual findings, largely as a result of the court's recognition of
the fact-finding function of tribunals and trial courts.
Standard of Review for Findings of Fact
In Housen,192 the Supreme Court, in the context of an appeal from a trial court, set
out the applicable standard of review:
A proposition that should be unnecessary to state is that a court of appeal should not inter-
fere with a trial judge's reasons unless there is a palpable and overriding error. The same
proposition is sometimes stated as prohibiting an appellate court from reviewing a trial
judge's decision if there was some evidence upon which he or she could have relied to reach
that conclusion. 
19 3
This statement of the law is equally applicable to administrative tribunals, includ-
ing the Board, albeit the specific language of "palpable and overriding error" is not
always explicitly referred to as the applicable test. How do we recognize such an er-
ror? The Supreme Court stated:
What is palpable error? The New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998) defines "palpable"
as "clear to the mind or plain to see" ... The Cambridge International Dictionary of English
(1996) describes it as "so obvious that it can easily be seen or known" ... The Random
191. See Vinogradovv. University of Calgary (1990), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 110 at 116 (Alb. C.A.).
192. Supra note 115.
193. Ibid. at para. 1 [emphasis added]. See also St. lean v. Mercier, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 491 at paras. 37 and 46;
and Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays (2008), 239 O.A.C. 299 (S.C.C.), where the majority, per Bastarache
J., at paras. 19-48, conducted an extensive review of the record and concluded, on the issues of bad
faith and discrimination, that the trial judge made a number of palpable and overriding errors. The
minority, per LeBel J., at paras. 84-113, was of the view that, "despite some flaws", there was a factual
foundation for the trial judge's findings that was adequate.
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House Dictionary of the English Language (2nd ed. 1987) defines it as "readily or plainly
seen" ...
The common element in each of these definitions is that palpable is plainly seen.
194
A palpable error, however, is not necessarily an overriding error. As noted by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Waxman v. Waxman:
195
An "overriding" error is an error that is sufficiently significant to vitiate the challenged finding
of fact. Where the challenged finding of fact is based on a constellation of findings, the
conclusion that one or more of those findings is founded on a "palpable" error does not
automatically mean that the error is also "overriding" The appellant must demonstrate that
the error goes to the root of the challenged finding offact such that the fact cannot safely stand
in the face of that error196 [citation omitted].
While the application of the "palpable and overriding error" standard has been re-
peatedly endorsed and applied by the courts, 197 it is to be noted that there is juris-
prudence concerning the Board (and elsewhere) referring to the application of an
apparently distinct reasonableness standard to findings of fact.198 In Southam,19 9
the court equated the standard of reasonableness with the standard to be applied in
reviewing findings of fact and noted that the closeness of the "cleajy wrong" test and
the standard of reasonableness were obvious. 20 0 The court also found that "clearly
wrong" did not go so far as patent unreasonableness, as there was some distinction
to be drawn between "clearly" and "patently" albeit acknowledging that they were
194. Ibid. at paras. 5, 6. The court also went on to note the policy reasons for employing a high level of ap-
pellate deference to findings of fact at paras. 10-18.
195. (2004), 186 O.A.C. 201(C.A.) [Waxman] [emphasis added].
196. Ibid. at para. 297 [emphasis added].
197. Despite its longstanding application, the palpable and overriding error standard of review had been
subjected to some intense criticism. R.D. Gibbens, supra note 7 at 452, has written:
The notion that the error must be "palpable and overriding" is more of a ritual incantation used to
justify appellate action rather than to determine when it is appropriate. Short of those cases where
the trial judge just got his proverbial sums wrong, the phrase is merely a tool by which any appellate
court can implement their own particular view of justice on the facts.
198. In Barrett v. Norquay Development Limited, [2003) O.J. No. 6274 at paras. 1, 2 (Div. Ct.) [Barrett], a
post-Housen decision (but without any reference to Housen, supra note 115), the court held that find-
ings of fact that cannot be reasonably supported by the evidence are errors of law. Barrett concerned a
tenants' claim that the landlord substantially interfered with their quiet enjoyment. The court held that
the finding that the landlord substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the unit by the
tenants, by failing to address a problem with a window, was reasonable on the evidence. Furthermore,
the abatement of rent and award of damages were justified on the evidence and the hearing officer
could not be said to be "clearly wrong" in such findings [emphasis added]. More recently, in Chadra v.
Kanaan, [2008] O.J. No. 2590 at para. 11 (Div. Ct.), the court, while not applying a standard of review
analysis, held that the Board was owed a "high degree of deference on its review of the facts and findings
of credibility" [Emphasis added.]
199. Supra note 8.
200. Ibid. at para. 59.
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"close synonyms"201 Furthermore, in Dr. Q., 20 2 there is authority for the proposition
that, while trial courts' factual findings would be subject to a palpable and overriding
error standard due to the nature of the question alone, the same could not be said
of administrative tribunals where the nature of the question was just one of the four
factors to consider in determining the applicable standard of review.203 Moreover,
the Supreme Court noted that some administrative bodies may have "relative institu-
tional expertise" in fact-finding.
20 4
However, the same standard of "palpable and overriding error" ought to be applied to
the review of findings of fact of both courts and tribunals. The use of the standard of
reasonableness terminology as applied to factual findings is not particularly helpful.
First, it is conceptually confusing to use a reasonableness standard because, in both
the court and tribunal contexts, an appellate court need not apply a Dunsmuir205
standard of review analysis to questions of fact, as the nature of the question itself
drives the scope of the inquiry.20 6 Second, the reasonableness standard and the palp-
able and overriding error standard are virtually indistinguishable standards. Thus,
whatever standard is applied at the Board, the practical result will be the same. In
reviewing questions of fact, the role of a reviewing court is not to posit alternate
interpretations of the evidence but rather to determine whether the interpretation
of the evidence was reasonable or whether it had some basis in the evidence. 20 7
In Waxman,20 8 the Court of Appeal attempted to reconcile the two standards by
concluding that the concepts of "unreasonable', "clearly wrong" and "palpable error"
were, in effect, one and the same standard:
After Housen, appellate courts will not review findings of fact ... by asking whether on the
totality of the evidence, those findings are reasonable ...
201. Ibid. at para. 60.
202. Dr. Q., supra note 4.
203. Ibid. at para. 33.
204. The Supreme Court cited Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 [Mossop] as au-
thority for its position respecting "relative institutional expertise" in the human rights context. In En-
trop v. Imperial Oil Ltd. (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 18 at para. 43 (C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal followed
Mossop and found that the standard of review of the Canadian Human Rights Commission's Board of
Inquiry's findings of fact (and the application of the law to those findings of fact) was reasonableness.
A year prior to Mossop, the Ontario Divisional Court, in Emrick Plastics v. Ontario (Human Rights
Commission) (1992), 55 O.A.C. 33 (Div. Ct.) [Emrick] found that the standard applied to a trial court's
findings of fact-i.e. palpable and overriding error-should also apply to findings of fact made by a
human rights tribunal. It is suggested that Emrick is the preferred approach.
205. Supra note 13.
206. Supra note 4 at para. 33, where McLachlin C.J.C. observed that the nature of the question almost en-
tirely determined the standard of review and factual findings would be interfered with only if there was
.palpable and overriding error" or where the finding was "clearly wrong".
207. Dr. Q., supra note 4 at para. 41.
208. Supra note 195.
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That is not to say that the approach favoured by the majority in Housen will change the
result of many fact-based appeals. A process which yields findings offact that cannot pass the
reasonableness standard of review will almost always be tainted by at least palpable error...
Similarly, a finding offact based on speculation and not logical inference will be subject to ap-
pellate correction not because the finding is unreasonable, although it clearly is, but because a
process offact-finding based on speculation is clearly wrong, and therefore constitutes palpable
error: [citation omitted] .209
In Dunsmuir,2 10 moreover, Justice Deschamps noted that questions of fact always
attract deference and that the use of different terminology-"palpable and overrid-
ing error" versus "unreasonable decision"-did not change the nature of the review,
where an appeal is based on an erroneous finding of fact:
Indeed, in the context of appellate review of court decisions, this Court has recognized that
these expressions as well as others all encapsulate the same principle of deference with respect
to a trial judge's findings of fact: [citation omitted]. Therefore, when the issue is limited to
questions of fact, there is no need to enquire into any other factor in order to determine that
deference is owed to an administrative decision maker.
2 11
Fact-finding is the principal function of the first-level decision-maker, whether a
trial judge or Board Member, and a high degree of deference to factual findings is the
operative approach. This is fundamentally so because of the distinct advantages the
trier of fact has. As stated in Housen:
2 12
The trial judge is better situated to make factual findings owing to his or her extensive
exposure to the evidence, the advantage of hearing testimony viva voce and the judge's
familiarity with the case as a whole. Because the primary role of the trial judge is to weigh
and assess voluminous quantities of evidence, the expertise and insight of the trial judge in
this area should be respected.
2 13
Like most tribunals, the Board need not comply with formal rules of evidence and
has a broad discretion to admit evidence in a hearing.2 14 The Board may determine
all questions of fact and law with regard to all matters within its jurisdiction.215 The
209. Thid. at paras. 305, 306 [emphasis added]. See also H.L. v. Canada (A.G.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401 at paras. 4,
55 and 56 [H.L.] per Fish J., who noted that the "palpable and overriding error" test should not be allowed
to displace "alternative formulations of the governing standard" and that the test is also met where a trial
judge's findings of fact can be characterized as "unreasonable' or "unsupported by the evidence" H.L. was
recently applied by a unanimous Supreme Court in RH. v. McDougall 2008 SCC 53 at para. 55.
210. Supra note 13.
211. Ibid. at para. 161 [emphasis added].
212. Supra note 115.
213. Ibid. at para. 18.
214. Section 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. S. 22 [SPPA] provides that a tribu-
nal may admit as evidence at a hearing, whether or not given or proven under oath or affirmation or
admissible as evidence in a court, (a) any oral testimony; and (b) any document or other thing, relevant
to the subject-matter of the proceeding and may act on such evidence, but the tribunal may exclude
anything unduly repetitious.
215. Section 174 of the RTA, supra note 2.
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Board, however, has an extremely high caseload and hears many applications in rela-
tively short time frames.216 As a result, the Board may be particularly susceptible to
legal challenges based on its fact-finding process by examining the adequacy of the
reasons provided in support of its findings.2 17 The objective is to identify flawed
findings of fact that amount to palpable and overriding errors that can be fairly
framed as questions of law. Examples of reviewable findings of fact include findings
made in the absence of evidence, findings made in conflict with accepted evidence,
findings based on a misapprehension of the evidence, findings based on credibility
assessments, or those findings of fact drawn from primary facts that are the result of
speculation rather than inference.
218
Extracting a Question of Law from Findings of Fact
Absence of Evidence219
Whether there is any evidence to support a finding of fact is a question of law.220 In
Krafczek v. 1320239 Ontario Ltd.,221 the tenant claimed that he had paid the arrears
216. The Board deals with approximately 60,000 applications a year and members are typically expected to
hear 15-20 cases in a 2Vh hour block of time, four times a week. See Richard Feldman, "The Landlord
and Tenant Board, Pressures, Powers and Practices in Ontario's New Residential Tenancy Regime: A
Year Later" (Law Society of Upper Canada CLE: 6 December 2007).
217. See below, Reviewing the Duty to Provide Reasons.
218. Waxman, supra note 195 at para 296. The issue of findings of fact drawn from primary facts that are
the result of speculation rather than inference is beyond the scope of this paper.
219. Ibid. The court stated (at para 334):
In addition to the all-out attack on the reasonableness of virtually all of the trial judge's crucial find-
ings on the central factual issues, the appellants also contend that the trial judge made innumerable
processing errors in the course of her reasons. The phrase "processing errors" is borrowed from
Keljanovic Estate v. Sanseverino, supra at 489-90 where O'Connor J.A., for the majority, said:
The second kind of error that may warrant appellate interference is what might be called a "process-
ing error', that is an error in processing the evidence that leads to a finding of fact. This type of
error arises when a trial judge fails to appreciate the evidence relevant to a factual issue, either by
disregarding or misapprehending that evidence. When the appellate court finds such an error it
must first determine the effect of that error on the trial judge's reasoning. It may interfere with
the trial judges finding if it concludes that the part of the trial judge's reasoning process that was
tainted by the error was essential to the challenged finding of fact. [Emphasis added.]
In addition, at paras. 343-45, Waxman also noted that a failure to consider relevant evidence is a
type of "processing error" and can amount to a palpable error if the evidence "was potentially sig-
nificant to a material finding of fact"
220. See Marcellos v. Woodbridge Management Ltd, [2006] O.J. No. 2540 at 1, 2 (Div. Ct.), where it was ar-
gued that the Tribunal erred in law by making findings unsupported by the evidence. The Court held:
An appeal of this nature can only be brought on a question of law, and accordingly, the standard of
review is correctness ... While the factual findings of the Tribunal are not subject to review, whether
or not there is any evidence to support a finding is a question of law. [Emphasis added.]
221. [2002] O.J. No. 2091 (Div. Ct.). See also Nepean Housing Corporation v. Kyababenin (2005), Court
File 05-DV-001 100 (Div. Ct.), where the Tribunal held that the tenant's negligence caused a fire in the
rental unit. The court allowed the tenant's appeal, finding that there was no evidence to support the
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in question to the landlord, but the landlord denied receipt of them. The Tribunal re-
served at the end of the hearing and ordered the tenant to pay the following month's
rent into the Tribunal. The tenant advised the Tribunal that he would do so. The
tenant paid the following month's rent into the Tribunal's bank account as directed,
but failed to return to the Tribunal with the receipt of payment.
The Tribunal assumed that the tenant had ignored the direction and used this appar-
ent failure of the tenant in assessing the tenant's credibility. A request to review, on
the basis that the finding of credibility was based on a clear error of fact, was denied.
On review it was held that the fact that the first Member did not know the tenant had
paid the money was due to the tenant's mistake of not returning the receipt, despite
this being a "commonly accepted and widely publicized administrative requirement
of the Tribunal" 222 Even if the tenant's failure to follow the Tribunal procedure was to
blame, the request to review was dismissed on the basis that the first Member had not
stated that the apparent failure to comply with the direction was the sole or deciding
factor in assessing the tenant's credibility.
The court allowed the tenant's appeal:
Member Feldman clearly used the tenant's apparent failure to make the payment of the
August rent into account of the tribunal as one of the factors in his adverse findings as to
the credibility of the tenant.
There is no evidence that the payment has not been made, in fact it had been made. But the
tenant had not filed the receipt from the bank with the tribunal.
Since the credibility finding may well have been influenced by this palpable and overriding
error in appreciating the evidence, it is necessary to send the matter back for a further hear-
ing confined to the issue of what sums are owing by the tenant for rent.
22 3
In contrast, the sufficiency of the evidence is not open to review.224 In Mills,225 the
Court of Appeal determined that the issue on appeal related to a finding of fact,
namely whether the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal's [WSIAT]
conclusion that a 1979 workplace accident was the cause of Mills's back problems.
The Court was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to make that finding.
226
Tribunal's conclusion that the tenant ought reasonably to have foreseen that the lamp in the bedroom
could present a risk of fire. In Barker v. Park Willow Developments, 2004 CanLII 2545 (Div. Ct.), the
court allowed an appeal from an ORHT decision where the ORHT had made findings on an issue in
the absence of any evidence on that issue.
222. Ibid. at paras. 2-4.
223. Ibid. [emphasis added].
224. See Carbonneau v. Ranger, 2005 CanLII 20804 (ON S.C.) for an example in the residential tenancy
context. The court rejected the argument that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error of
law in finding that the trailer park owner interfered with the contract of sale negotiated by one of the
tenants. The court, at paras. 5-9, found there was "ample evidence" to support such a finding.
225. Supra note 57.
226. Ibid. at paras. 34, 35.
"But Only on a Question of Law" 149
Despite the issue being that of a finding of fact, the Court made no reference to the
test of palpable and overriding error, as might be expected in light of Housen.227
Arguably, Mills228 is, at root, a some evidence decision that warranted deference, as
there were no significant errors in the fact-finding process. As such, the WSIAT's
reasoning and conclusions were not unreasonable.
229
Refusal to Consider, Ignoring or Excluding Evidence
In Manafa v. Rickersby,230 the Tribunal refused to consider documentary evidence at
the hearing and confined submissions to what had been said before the Tribunal. On
appeal, the court held:
In our view this ruling amounts to a judicial error and a denial of natural justice. It is ap-
parent from the transcript that there was some reference by the Tribunal to some of the
documents such as the lease and the mover's receipt.
In our view, a new hearing is necessary and we wish to say that the relevance of documents
to the issues before the Tribunal ought to be the guiding principle for admission and/or
submissions. A rule to consider only oral submissions runs the risk of excluding relevant docu-
ments from the Tribunal's consideration. In our view theailure to consider possibly relevant
evidence that was part of the record constituted an error.
Misapprehension of the Evidence
In Waxman,232 the Court of Appeal found that a misapprehension of the evidence
may amount to palpable and overriding error.233 The crucial point with respect to
claims of misapprehension of the evidence is that only essential or material findings
of fact will be reviewable. Thus, a tribunal may err in a finding of fact but if that
fact is not essential to the outcome then it is not reviewable. 234 For this reason, a
misapprehension of the evidence must amount to what is commonly referred to as a
"material error'"235
227. Supra note 115.
228. Supra note 57.
229. Ibid. at para. 55.
230. (2005), 206 O.A.C. 254 (Div. Ct.). See also D'Costa v. Mortakis et al. (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.)
at para. 37, for authority that a court may interfere with a finding of fact if the trial judge disregards
evidence relevant to the issue being determined.
231. Ibid. at paras. 1, 2 [emphasis added]. The refusal to consider evidence may also be characterized as a
denial of natural justice and procedural fairness. See below, Reviewing Questions of Natural Justice and
Procedural Fairness.
232. Supra note 195.
233. Ibid. at para. 296.
234. See Opara v. Cook [2008] O.J. No. 1934 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 9-11, for an example of the Tribunal misap-
prehending the evidence in two respects but without having any material impact on the result.
235. Housen, supra note 115 at para. 72 (citing Van de Perre v. Edwards, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014 at para. 15):
[T]his Court has previously held that an omission is only a material error if it gives rise to a reasoned
belief that the trial judge must have forgotten, ignored or misconceived the evidence in a way that
affected his conclusion.
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In Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program) v. Crane,236 the Court of Appeal held
that the SBT erred in finding the recipient had been working part-time for approxi-
mately three years whereas, in fact, she had been working for only four months prior
to the hearing. The error was characterized as a misapprehension of the evidence:
In my view, the majority was correct to conclude that this misapprehension of the evidence
amounted to a palpable and overriding error. The Tribunal made the same error twice, so
there can be no suggestion that the error was merely a typographical error. The error relates
to a crucial part of the evidence, namely, Ms. Crane's work history. The error is a substantial
one-there is a large difference between four months and three years continuous part-time
work.
2 37
In Yusuf v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services, Director of Income
Maintenance),238 an appeal of a decision of the Social Assistance Review Board
[SARBI denying eligibility for social assistance as a single parent under the Family
Benefits Act,2 39 the majority held that the court ought not to review findings of fact
unless there was an absence of evidence or a material misapprehension of the evi-
dence. The court declined to interfere with SARB's findings of fact as it found that
"they appear reasonably based upon the available evidence" 240 In a lengthy dissent,
however, Justice Aitken found, among other errors in its treatment of the evidence,
that SARB misapprehended the evidence of marriage breakdown that was adduced
on behalf of the appellant and erred in concluding that there was nothing in the
respondent's evidence that supported a finding that the appellant's spouse had been
violent with the appellant.
241
Credibility Assessments
Findings of fact receive the greatest deference and, where they turn on the credibility
of witnesses, it is particularly difficult to disturb them, especially where some reasons
are provided for rejecting the evidence of a witness.242 As noted by the Supreme
Court in R. v. Gagnon:
243
Assessing credibility is not a science. It is very difficult for a trial judge to articulate with
precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listen-
ing to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the various versions of events. That is why this
236. (2006), 83 OR. (3d) 321 (C.A.).
237. Ibid. at para. 36 [emphasis added].
238. [2002] O.J. No. 1659 (Div. Ct.) [YusuJ]. Leave to appeal to Court of Appeal granted (18 November
2002), Court File No. M28580 (C.A.). The appeal was later withdrawn.
239. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.2 (repealed).
240. Supra note 238 at para. 2.
241. Ibid. at paras. 55-59.
242. Dr. Q., supra note 4, at para. 38, where McLachlin C.J.C. noted that assessments of credibility were
questions of fact and the relative advantage of the trier of fact must be respected and that the issue is
whether there is some basis in the evidence for the trier of fact's conclusions.
243. (2006] 1 S.C.R. 621.
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Court decided, most recently in H.L., that in the absence of a palpable and overriding error
by the trial judge, his or her perceptions should be respected.
24 4
Moreover, in Waxman,24 5 the Court of Appeal noted with regard to alleged errors in
credibility assessments:
Although the "palpable and overriding" standard of review applies to all factual findings,
Housen ... recognizes that findings of fact grounded in credibility assessments will be par-
ticularly difficult to disturb on appeal. Credibility assessments are inherently partly sub-
jective and reflect the life experience of individual judges and their own perception of how
the world works. Credibility assessments are also grounded in numerous, often unstated
considerations which only the trial judge can appreciate and calibrate.
Deference to the findings of credibility includes giving full force and effect to those find-
ings. An allegation that a trial judge has made a palpable and overriding error in assessing a
witness' credibility can only be evaluated by examining the entirety of the record touching
on that credibility assessment. Where a trial judge advances several reasons for rejecting a
witness' testimony in its entirety as incredible, a demonstrated error in relation to ust one
of those reasons will not necessarily warrant reversal of the credibility assessment.
24 6
Nevertheless, findings of fact based on credibility assessments may constitute revers-
ible error. They are most effectively challenged on the basis that the reasons provided
do not adequately disclose why some evidence was accepted and other evidence re-
jected. 47 There is considerable authority to the effect that a party is entitled to know
why his or her evidence was disbelieved and that adequate reasons are required when
making adverse findings of credibility.
248
244. Ibid. at para. 20. There is a long line of Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing that findings of fact
based on credibility of witnesses are not to be reversed on appeal unless there is some palpable and
overriding error: see Lensen v. Lensen [1987] 2 S.C.R. 672 at para. 8.
245. Supra note 195.
246. Ibid. at paras. 359, 360.
247. Ibid. The Court of Appeal also noted that (at para. 364):
Although credibility assessments ... are difficult to reverse on appeal, they are not immune from
appellate review. For example, a credibility finding that is arbitrary in that it is based on an irrelevant
consideration or tainted by a processing error can be set aside on appeal.
248. See Re Pitts and Director of Family Benefits Branch of the Ministry of Community & Social Services
(1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 302 at para. 30 (Div. Ct.) per Reid J.:
The task of determining credibility may be a difficult one but it must be faced. If the board sees fit to
reject a claim on the ground of credibility, it owes a duty to the claimant to state clearly its grounds
for disbelief. The board cannot simply say, as the Member did here, "I feel that I have not received
credible evidence to rescind the decision of the Respondent" Some reason for thinking the evidence
not credible must be given if an appearance of arbitrariness is to be avoided.
See also Dowlut v. Ontario (Commissioner of Social Services) (1985), 11 Admin. L.R. 54 at para. 20
(Div. Ct.). But see Trotter v. College of Nurses of Ontario, [1991] O.J. No. 348 (Div. Ct.) [unreported];
and Devgan v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, [2005] O.J. No. 306 at para. 54 (Div. Ct)
[Devgan], where the court held that while it was preferable to give reasons for rejecting the credibility
of a witness, a failure to do so does not constitute reversible error.
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In Bell v. Peel Living,24 9 the tenant missed her original hearing because she was ill.
A new hearing was granted and the tenant gave her evidence that she was too ill to
attend the original hearing. There was no evidence to the contrary but the Tribunal
did not believe the tenant. On appeal, the court found that the tenant was entitled to
a full hearing on the merits:
250
The Member did not make a specific finding that he did not believe the tenant and he did
not make a specific finding that she was not ill at the time of the first hearing ... It is not
possible for us to know whether the Member understood that if the tenant was ill nothing
further was required and a rehearing should have been ordered. Further, if the Member did
reject the complainant's evidence we have no indication of why he did so251 ...
It is of course open to a trier of fact to reject evidence he finds lacks credibility. However, in
our view, in circumstances such as this, it is incumbent on the trier of fact to provide some
indication of the basis for that finding. The reasons need not be lengthy. However, the tenant is
entitled to know the reasons her evidence was rejected as untruthful or unreliable.2 52
Bell 253 highlights that a trier of fact must provide reasons for finding against a party's
version of events. It is inadequate to simply state that the evidence is disbelieved or
not accepted. The tenant gave uncontradicted evidence that she had been ill and the
Tribunal had no evidence to the contrary. In making an adverse finding of credibility
against the tenant the Tribunal erred in failing to explain why.
Lastly, even where some reasons are provided in making credibility assessments,
those reasons may be subjected to review, albeit it would likely be a rare case when
this would occur. In Yusuf 254 the minority judgment was critical of the findings of
adverse credibility against the appellant. Justice Aitken concluded that "adverse cred-
ibility findings cannot be based on the blanket assumption that because a litigant has
something to gain from the litigation, that of necessity puts that witness' credibility
into doubt:'
255
Justice Aitken further observed:
In the case at hand, unlike the Re Pitts Case,256 the SARB did provide some reasons why
it "was not compelled by the Appellants evidence" The chief reason seemed to be that the
Appellant and Mr. Habib "had everything to gain financially" by leading the Respondent to
believe that Mr. Habib was not living with the Appellant or residing in the same dwelling
place with the Appellant. This cannot be the basis upon which the SARB rejects an appellant's
credibility, as this reason would apply to any appellant challenging the Respondent's findings
249. Peel Living v. Bell (17 January 2005), Court File No. DC 03-12624-00 (Div. Ct.) [Bell].
250. Ibid. at 1, para. 3.
251. Ibid. at para. 5.
252. Ibid. at para. 7 [emphasis added].
253. Supra note 249.
254. Supra note 238.
255. Ibid. at para. 67.
256. Supra note 248.
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regarding her status as a single person. Decisions concerning credibility cannot be founded on
a pervasive scepticism about the validity of claims for family benefits. At best this reality should
represent one small factor which may tip the scales against an appellant after those scales are
already weighed down by other cogent evidence.
2 57
REVIEWING THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
The concept of discretion refers to decisions where the law does not dictate a specific
outcome, or where the decision-maker is given a choice of options within a statutorily
imposed set of boundaries.
258
In essence, the exercise of discretion involves the weighing of factors in the context of
balancing competing interests. The Board's statutory exercises of discretion include
considering requests for relief from eviction,259 imposing conditions in orders,26 °
and determining claims for abatements of rent or other remedies.26 1 In general, the
Board's discretionary decisions, as with those of other tribunals and the courts, will
be accorded a high degree of deference. This is the case not because of any deference
to the Board's expertise in exercising its discretion but due to the very nature of dis-
cretion, which presumes that there is a range of reasonable options and not only one
correct answer. The Board's discretionary decisions will attract a deferential standard
of review, or review on a reasonableness standard, subject to three main, but not
exhaustive, exceptions where the Board may be said to have erred in law due to the
existence of jurisdictional error, which attracts a correctness standard of review.
262
These jurisdictional errors occur where the Board's discretion is not exercised at all,
where the discretion is exercised outside the scope of the statutory authority (or out-
side the statutorily imposed set of boundaries), and where the discretion is exercised
in contravention of the duty to be fair.
Failure to Exercise Discretion
In some instances, the Board may fail to exercise its discretion at all and thereby
commit an error of law. In First Homes Society v. Henry,263 the tenants presented new
evidence at a review hearing indicating that depression and other medical problems
caused them to miss rent payments. The court stated:
257. Supra note 238 at para. 41 [emphasis added].
258. Baker v. Minister (Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para. 52 [Baker].
259. RTA, supra note 2, section 83(1).
260. Ibid. section 204(1).
261. Ibid. sections 30 and 31.
262. Mullan has noted, supra note 60 at 82, that traditionally the correctness standard is automatic for juris-
diction-conferring issues and, furthermore, questions that need to engage in the balancing analysis of
the standard of review analysis.
263. [2002] O.J. No. 1754 (Div. Ct.).
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The guidelines for reception of new evidence rest in the reviewing Member a discretion
to accept or reject new evidence when proffered. Regrettably, we can only speculate on
whether she accepted or rejected this proffered evidence, for her reasons are silent on it.
We can only conclude that she failed to exercise this discretion at all. This failure to make a
decision which is a necessary part of determining the issues before her was an error of law.
264
The failure to exercise discretion may also be characterized as a jurisdictional error
or, more particularly, as an improper refusal of jurisdiction and thus as a question
of law.265 In Gramercy Apartments Ltd. v. Alexander Anthony et al.,26 6 the Tribunal
failed to address the landlord's requests to file missing documentation in its applica-
tion for a rent increase. The court held:
The Adjudicator's failure to consider these requests amounts to an "unreasonable exercise
of the discretion conferred" by the legislation [citation omitted] 26 7 ... This failure to ex-
ercise the discretion conferred upon the Adjudicator by the legislation is unreasonable and
amounts to an improper refusal of jurisdiction and therefore, constitutes an error in law
26 8
[citation omitted].
In Capano v. Smith,269 the eviction application claimed the tenant caused substantial
interference and undue damage due to the presence of a fish pool inside the unit.
The Board made no order with respect to the removal of the pool on the basis that it
had no jurisdiction to make such an order. On appeal, the majority held the Board's
determination that it could not "fashion a common sense remedy, even amounting
to something akin to a mandatory injunction' would unduly limit the Board and
reduce its mandate significantly.270 The court observed that section 190(1) of the
TPA271 gave the Board a broad discretionary power to make any order it considered
fair in the circumstances. In the majoritys view, the failure to order the removal of
the pool completely ignored this provision and amounted to an error of law.
272
Both of the above decisions made no reference to a standard of review analysis. The
jurisprudence is not clear whether such an analysis is applicable or, if so, in what
circumstances. The question of the standard of review to be applied and by what
manner a court may determine the standard is complicated, particularly in those cir-
264. Ibid. at para 1 [emphasis added].
265. Southam, supra notes 8 and 101.
266. [2008] O.J. No. 673 (Div. Ct.).
267. Ibid. at para. 33 [citing Baker, supra note 258, at para. 65].
268. Ibid. [citing Leonelli v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] F.C.J. No. 1756 (F.C.) at para. 44] [emphasis added].
269. Supra note 61.
270. Ibid. at para. 22.
271. Supra note 3. This is now section 204(1) of the RTA, supra note 260.
272. Supra note 61 at para. 22. The minority, per Swinton J., also found that the Board had discretion to
include in an order any condition that it considered fair in the circumstances. In fashioning an ap-
propriate remedy, the Board ought to have considered whether conditions should have been imposed
pursuant to s. 190(1), given the breach and the risk of further damage. Its failure to consider this provi-
sion and this evidence was an error of law.
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cumstances where the discretion is argued to have been exercised outside the proper
scope of the statutory authority or in contravention of the principles of procedural
fairness. We now turn to an examination of the issue of the standard of review of the
exercise of discretion.
The Standard of Review of the Exercise of Discretion
It is indisputable that all tribunals are entitled to control their own procedure and will
be accorded deference on matters requiring an exercise of statutory discretion.273
But in what circumstances will a court intervene? What is the standard of review
to be applied to the Board's discretionary decisions and, more particularly, does the
Dunsmuir274 standard of review analysis apply?
Exercise of Discretion: The Established Rule
The traditional approach to discretionary decisions is that they are reviewable only
on limited and discrete grounds including bad faith, breach of natural justice and
improper purpose. In Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Canada,275 the Supreme Court
stated that:
It is, as well, a clearly-established rule that the courts should not interfere with the exercise
of discretion by a statutory authority merely because the court might have exercised the
discretion in a different manner had it been charged with that responsibility. Where the
statutory discretion has been exercised in good faith, and, where required, in accordance with
the principles of natural justice, and where reliance has not been placed upon considerations
irrelevant or extraneous to the statutory purpose, the court should not interfere.
2 76
While the rule itself may be clearly established, its application is less clear. As ex-
plored in more detail below, what distinguishes an error in law warranting court
intervention from a court simply exercising its discretion in a manner different from
the Board? As the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged, the courts have justifi-
ably received criticism for arrogating to themselves powers to substitute their own
view under such "vague doctrinal terms" as "irrelevant considerations', "improper
purpose", "reasonableness" and "bad faith".2 77
Exercise of Discretion: The Correctness Standard
As noted, the question of identifying the appropriate standard of review may be
approached solely by classifying the question at issue as being one of jurisdiction.
The Board, as a creature of statute, must be correct in determining the scope of its
delegated mandate, and the scope of discretionary jurisdiction is a question of law
that ultimately must be supervised by the courts. The challenge, therefore, becomes
273. Kalin v. Ontario College of Teachers (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 523 at para. 9 (Div. Ct.) [Kahn].
274. Supra note 13.
275. Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Government of Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2.
276. Ibid. at 5 [emphasis added].
277. Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [ 1994] 1 S.C.R. 231 at para. 18 per McLachlin J.
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whether the issue under review is one concerning the scope of discretionary jurisdic-
tion (reviewable) or merely one of the weight given to factors properly within the
scope of the statutory grant of discretionary jurisdiction (not reviewable).
Blake has observed that correctness is never applied as the standard of review to
discretionary decisions, 278 which are reviewable only as being unreasonable or pat-
ently unreasonable.279 However, this assumes that the issue is framed by the courts
as not involving the scope of the statutory mandate. In Chieu v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration),28 ° the Supreme Court defined the issue as whether
the phrase "having regard to all the circumstances of the case" in the Immigration
Act 281 allowed the Immigration Appeal Division to consider the potential foreign
hardship a permanent resident would face if removed from Canada or whether only
domestic factors could be taken into account. Given that the statutory phrase "all of
the circumstances" is very broad and does not provide any guidelines as to how the
discretion is to be exercised, the question becomes a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion-what is or is not a relevant factor to be included in defining the proper scope of
"all of the circumstances"? As an issue of jurisdiction, the court concluded that "little
deference" should be shown and applied a standard of correctness.
282
In general, the courts have not applied a jurisdictional analysis to the question of
whether the discretion has been appropriately exercised and, moreover, have not ap-
plied the standard of review analysis. In residential tenancy jurisprudence, there is
a longstanding application of an "error in principle" test to questions of statutory
discretion. In particular, the error in principle test has been consistently applied to
discretionary decisions involving the Board's power to grant relief from eviction.
283
This test is one that reflects a high degree of deference. The court's task is not to
reweigh the factors considered and, in general, a court should intervene only to de-
termine whether the factors considered are properly within the scope of the statutory
278. Blake, Administrative Law in Canada, supra note 14 at 216.
279. Ibid. Of course, in light of Dunsmuir, supra note 13, there can no longer be any reference to the patently
unreasonable standard. Blake supra note 14 at 216 has noted:
A discretionary decision that is patently unreasonable is, essentially, one that is beyond the scope
of the statutory authority or an abuse of the power. However, a statutory discretion to choose from
a variety of options in the adjudication of an individual case may be reviewable on a standard of
reasonableness.
280. [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84 [Chieu].
281. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, section 70(1)(b).
282. Supra, note 280 at 100.
283. See also Sidaplex-Plastic Suppliers, Inc. v. Elta Group Inc. (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 563 at para. 4 (C.A.),
where the Court of Appeal considered a provision of the Business Corporations Act provided the Court
with a broad discretionary power, under section 248(3) to "make any interim or final order it thinks fit"
to rectify the consequences of oppressive conduct. The Court held that:
This gives the Court at first instance a broad discretion and the appellate Court a limited power of
review. The appellate Court is entitled to interfere only where it is established that the Court at first
instance has erred in principle or its decision is otherwise unjust.
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discretionary authority or whether factors properly within the scope of discretionary
authority have failed to be considered. In conducting this type of review, it is sug-
gested that a court applies, in effect, a correctness standard. Questions with respect to
the proper scope of the Board's statutory discretion are questions that do not permit
more than one answer.
Exercise of Discretion: The Reasonableness Standard
In Baker,284 the pragmatic and functional approach was applied to the substantive
aspects of discretionary decisions,285 and given Dunsmuir,286 it might be expected
that the new standard of review analysis will apply to the substantive discretionary
decisions of the Board. If so, and with the demise of the patently unreasonable stan-
dard in Dunsmuir,287 substantive discretionary decisions will now, in all likelihood,
be reviewed on a reasonableness standard.288 In Baker,289 it was noted that a general
doctrine of "unreasonableness" has been applied to discretionary decisions and this
incorporated the idea that considerable deference will be given in reviewing the ex-
ercise of discretion.
290
Under the RTA, the Board has a broad equitable discretion to refuse or delay an
eviction even where the landlord has established that grounds for eviction exist.29
1
However, it is rare that such a question about the proper exercise of discretionary
relief from eviction is explicitly framed as a question of law.292 The general trend
284. Supra note 258.
285. Ibid. EHeureux-Dub6 J. stated at para. 55:
The "pragmatic and functional" approach recognizes that standards of review for errors of law are
appropriately seen as a spectrum, with certain decisions being entitled to more deference, and others
entitled to less [citations omitted] ... In my opinion the standard of review of the substantive aspects of
discretionary decisions is best approached within this framework, especially given the difficulty in mak-
ing rigid classifications between discretionary and non-discretionary decisions. [Emphasis added.]
See also Dr. Q., supra note 4 at para 22, where the Supreme Court appeared to incorporate the nomi-
nate grounds of abuse for discretion within the pragmatic and functional approach. For discussion on
the difficulties with this approach, see Mullan, supra note 60 at 64-68 and 95.
286. Supra note 13. Bastarache and LeBel jj. noted, at para. 53, that where the question is one of discretion,
"deference will usually apply automatically" Deschamps J. noted, at para. 165, that "deference was owed
to exercise of discretion, unless the body has exceeded its mandate'
287. Ibid.
288. In Baker, supra note 258, the court held that the decision about whether to grant a humanitarian and
compassionate exemption involved a considerable appreciation of the facts and did not involve the ap-
plication or interpretation of legal rules. The court concluded, at paras. 61 and 62, that the appropriate
standard was reasonableness.
289. Ibid.
290. Ibid. at para. 53 (citing Associated Provincial Picture House Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1
K.B. 223 (C.A.)).
291. Supra notes 67 and 259.
292. Hung v. C.L.K. . Enterprises, [1999] O.J. No. 3559 at para. 3 (Div. Ct.) is an exception. The court char-
acterized an exercise of discretion to grant relief from eviction as an error in law.
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of pre-Dunsmuir293 jurisprudence on appeals from the Board was that the proper
standard to be applied was patent unreasonableness. 294 However, a court has rarely,
if ever, conducted a review of the factors set out in the pragmatic and functional
approach in the context of an appeal from the Board of a discretionary decision.
295
In Chieu,29 6 the Supreme Court did apply the former pragmatic and functional ap-
proach in a deportation case to statutory language in the Immigration Act that closely
mirrored the Board's broad discretion in the RTA to grant relief from eviction, in
particular, to have regard to all of the circumstances of the case. In other words, for
example, failing to consider a factor properly within the ambit of the discretionary
mandate could be viewed as both an error in principle and an error of jurisdiction.
From either perspective, the result is identical as the court accords little deference
and intervenes to correct the legal error.
Exercise of Discretion: The Error in Principle Approach
In Finnermark v. Hum,29 7 the landlord applied for an eviction as he required posses-
sion of the property for himself and his children. The tenant requested relief from
eviction. The court held:
In our view, the Tribunal reviewed all of the evidence and exercised its discretion in a judi-
cial way regarding the issues under s. 84 of the Tenant Protection Act. We cannot say that
the Tribunal has erred in principle or misinterpreted material evidence or that its decision is
in any way unjust [citation omitted] .2 9 8
293. Supra note 13.
294. Smolcec, supra note 34 at paras. 21, 22 where the court noted:
The referenced authorities hold that the Tribunal has the duty to consider all the relevant issues
under s. 84 and to make findings of fact with respect to those issues. However, once the Tribunal
has made its findings under s. 84 a Court on appeal will afford the Tribunal a great deal of deference
... In my view the standard of review to be applied in this case, given that it involves findings of the
Tribunal under s. 84 of the TPA is that of "patently unreasonable:'
The patent unreasonableness standard was also applied to relief from eviction in Sutherland v. Lamon-
tagne (3 March 2008), Court File No. DV-756-07 (Div. Ct.). See also Price v. Turnbull's Grove Inc. (18
April 2006), Court File No. 1503 (Div. Ct.) (reversed on other grounds Price v. Turnbull's Grove Inc.
(2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.)); and Tirado, supra note 65. In O'Regan, supra note 102 at paras. 44 and
47, the court considered the relief from eviction provisions in the TPA:
The decision in Longhouse Village (Thunder Bay) Inc. v. Smolcec ... and s. 84, Tenant Protection Act
1997 have settled the question that the application of s. 84 of the Tenant Protection Act is not strictly
a jurisdictional issue, but falls within the expertise of the Tribunal. Once the Tribunal has made its
findings under s. 84, a Court on appeal will afford the Tribunal a great deal of deference. The standard
of review to be applied when involving findings of the Tribunal under s. 84 of is that of "patently un-
reasonable." [Emphasis added.]
295. The author is unaware of any such case.
296. Supra note 280.
297. [2000] O.J. No. 3727 (Div. Ct.).
298. Ibid. at para. 6 [emphasis added].
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From one perspective, the error in principle approach reviews the substantive result
and reflects the view that a court will not interfere with an exercise of discretion,
even where it may disagree with the manner in which the discretion has been exer-
cised.299 In other words, a range of reasonable conclusions are open to the Board and
it is only where the decision is unreasonable that a reviewing court will be justified
in intervening.300 The Supreme Court has recognized that a discretionary decision
should not be disturbed unless the decision-maker has made "some error in principle
in exercising its discretion or has exercised its discretion in a capricious or vexatious
manner"
301
In Asbestos Corp., Societe Nationale de lAmiante and Quebec (Province), Re,3 02 the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that a reviewing court should interfere with the exer-
cise of discretion only where the tribunal has "erred in principle, acted capriciously
or made a decision that amounts to a miscarriage of justice". The court provided a
useful, if somewhat expansive, working definition of what constitutes an error in
principle:
Error in principle is a broad term that embraces many different grounds of review. It has
been held to include not only error of law or applying a wrong legal principle, but as well,
failing to take into account a relevant factor, taking into account an irrelevant factor, failing
299. See Peel Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. McNamara (1991), 2 O.R. (3d) 414 (Div. Ct.) at 415 [McNamara
No. 2].
300. In short, applying pre-Dunsmuir, supra note 13, terminology, the decision may have to descend to the
point of patent unreasonableness in order for a discretionary decision to be overturned. In Canadian
Union of Public Employees (C. UP.E.) v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 at para. 164
[C. UP.E.] Binnie J., writing for the majority, stated:
However, applying the more deferential patent unreasonableness standard, a judge should intervene
if persuaded that there is no room for reasonable disagreement as to the decision maker's failure
to comply with the legislative intent. In a sense, like the correctness standard, the patently unrea-
sonable standard admits only one answer. A correctness approach means there is only one proper
answer. A patently unreasonable one means that there could have been many appropriate answers,
but not the one reached by the decision maker.
301 In Cooke v. Mathur (19 February 2003), Court File No. 02-DV-000662 (Div. Ct.) the tenant brought an
application for harassment, interference and illegal entry. At the hearing, the tenant refused to disclose
the documents upon which she intended to rely. The Tribunal dismissed the application, ordered the
tenant to pay the landlord's costs of $375 and made it a condition that no further application could be
brought by the tenant until the costs were paid. The court held that section 190(1) of the TPA, supra
note 2, was broad enough to permit the Tribunal to impose such a term on the tenant but that such an
"exceptional order should only be made sparingly" The court concluded that the discretion was exer-
cised reasonably in the circumstances:
On the record before us, it is not possible to conclude that the order amounts to a denial of natural
justice and procedural fairness or improperly fetters the jurisdiction of another Tribunal Member
on a future application, nor has the tenant demonstrated that Member McInnis exercised his discre-
tion unreasonably in the particular circumstances of this case.
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Immigration & Citizenship), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 34 [Suresh] [citing
Pezim, supra, note 17].
302. (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.), aff'd [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132.
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to give sufficient weight to a relevant factor, over-emphasizing a relevant factor and misap-
prehending the evidence.
3 03
The issue therefore becomes to what extent the result may be driven by an appellate
court substituting its own exercise of discretion rather than by the Board's error in
principle. However, if not giving "sufficient weight to" or "overemphasizing" relevant
factors are legitimate errors in principle, then there would appear to be very little to
prevent a court from interfering where it sees fit to do so. It is suggested, however, that
a court ought not interfere with the weight accorded to particular factors where the
factors have been considered by the Board, even if a reviewing court might have as-
signed different weights to the relevant factors in the exercise of its own discretion.
Exercise of Discretion: The Application of the Error in Principle Approach
In London & Middlesex Housing Authority v. Graystone,30 4 the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that intervention should occur on matters of discretion to grant relief
from eviction only "if the trial judge misdirects himself or if his decision is so clearly
wrong as to amount to an injustice"3 °5 The majority found that two misdirections
were committed by the trial judge. First, the judge erred in taking into account the
possible effects on other tenants in other buildings where the tenant might relocate.
Second, the judge erred in considering the fact that the tenant had already been
convicted and sentenced in relation to the same matter and that an eviction would
constitute a further punishment.30 6 The majority concluded the trial judge had con-
sidered "inappropriate criteria" but, alternatively, could have categorized this as the
consideration of irrelevant factors, 30 7 or as an excess of jurisdiction by considering
factors not within the scope of the trial judge's discretionary jurisdiction. In contrast,
the minority judgment of Justice Borins found that the trial judge took into con-
303. Ibid. at paras. 33, 34.
304. (22 March 1995), File No. 426 (Div. Ct.) [Graystone]. Rosenberg J. delivered the majority judgment.
305. The majority cited Alsom v. Alsom [sic], [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1367 at 1375. Elsom was also applied in McNa-
mara No. 2, supra note 299.
306. Graystone, supra note 304 at 4.
307. The similarity between the former standard of patent unreasonableness and the traditional discrete
grounds of review for abuse of discretion (see Maple Lodge, supra note 275) was remarked upon in
Suresh, supra note 301 at para. 29. In an unanimous decision, the court noted:
The first question is what standard should be adopted with respect to the Minister's decision that a
refugee constitutes a danger to the security of Canada. We agree with Robertson J.A. that the review-
ing Court should adopt a deferential approach to this question and should set aside the Minister's
discretionary decision if it is patently unreasonable in the sense that it was made arbitrarily or in bad
faith, it cannot be supported on the evidence, or the Minister failed to consider the appropriate factors.
[Emphasis added.]
See also para. 41 where the court compared a patently unreasonable decision to one that is "unreason-
able on its face, unsupported by evidence, or vitiated by the failure to consider the proper factors or
apply the appropriate procedures"
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sideration the correct principles, even though he may have come to a result different
from that of the trial judge.
30 8
A number of cases have considered the issue of relief from eviction in the context of
subsidized housing and misrepresentation as to income or other income eligibility
criteria. The decisions are not easy to reconcile and reflect the difficulty courts may
have in refraining from substituting their own views of how the lower court's discre-
tion should be exercised. In Peel Non-Profit Housing Corporation v. McNamara,
30 9
the trial judge granted relief from eviction to a disabled tenant after he and his spouse
omitted the spouse's income from their declaration of income to the social hous-
ing provider. The court exercised its discretion not to terminate the tenancy as it
would be a disproportionate penalty for the tenant and an unjustified punishment
for the tenant's two children. 310 On appeal, the court found that while none of the
members of the panel would have disposed of the matter in the same manner as the
trial judge,311 the decision was not so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice.312
Justice Steele noted:
Conversely, [the trial judge] also considered the special circumstances of this particular
male tenant who had lied. The male tenant has been found to be permanently unemploy-
able, is on welfare assistance, has two infant children and has very limited income ... The
judge considered the effects upon the male tenant, the welfare of the children and the whole
concept of public assistance to a person such as the male tenant.
3 13
More recently however, in Greater Sudbury Housing Authority v. Racicot,314 the court
found the Tribunal erred in exercising its discretion not to evict. The tenants had
lied on their application for social housing by failing to report that they owed arrears
of rent to a previous social housing provider. Apart from this misrepresentation,
the tenants qualified for the housing. The Tribunal ordered the tenants to reach an
agreement with the former subsidized housing landlord regarding the payment of
the arrears and that, if this was not done by a specific date, the current landlord could
reopen the application for eviction on notice to the tenant.
On appeal, the court noted that "it is not for this court simply to substitute its own
discretion for that of the Tribunal"315 and held that the granting of relief from evic-
tion in these circumstances was an exercise of discretion on a wrong principle for
two reasons: by condoning the misrepresentation at the expense of honest applicants
and by failing to consider the impact on the integrity of the social housing system of
308. Supra note 304 at 5.
309. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 450 (Dist. Ct.) [McNamara No. 1].
310. Ibid. at 457.
311. Supra note 299 at 415.
312. Ibid. at 416.
313. Ibid.
314. [2003] O.. No. 816 (Div. Ct.) [Racicot].
315. Ibid. at2.
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this condoning of fraud.316 The court noted that there was no evidence of any greater
hardship on this family than the hardship suffered by the unhoused applicants they
had displaced. The court concluded that to withhold eviction in this case was not just
wrong in principle, but was "so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice, not only to
the housing authority, but also to those honest applicants affected."
317
Racicot318 distinguished McNamara No. 2319 on the basis that in that case the court
had considered the harm to the integrity of the system but decided that it was out-
weighed by the special circumstances of the tenant.320 Yet the Tribunal decision
clearly identified, albeit briefly, the difficulty of condoning the tenants' misrepresen-
tation at the expense of other applicants for subsidized housing,32 1 and nevertheless
decided to grant relief from eviction on terms and conditions despite the tenants'
misrepresentations. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the court was simply
dissatisfied with the weight the Tribunal accorded to this factor as opposed to the
Tribunal failing to consider it at all. In short, the Tribunal felt that the tenants' own
circumstances outweighed the impact on other applicants and the subsidized hous-
ing system.
Conclusion: Standard of Review of Exercise of Discretion
It is suggested that the "error in principle" approach is very similar analytically to the
correctness standard if approached from the perspective of jurisdiction, but can also
be considered as a reasonableness standard if approached from the perspective of the
substantive result. A court will not intervene unless the Board's exercise of discretion
was beyond the range of reasonable outcomes. An unreasonable exercise of discretion
cannot stand.322 It is further suggested that an unreasonable exercise of discretion is
also conceptually related to the traditional discrete grounds for reviewing discre-
tion as articulated in Maple Lodge.323 If a discretionary decision is based upon, for
316. Ibid. at paras. 12, 13.
317. Ibid. at para. 13.
318. Supra note 314.
319. Supra note 299.
320. Racicot, supra note 314 at para. 12.
321. Greater Sudbury Housing Corporation v. Racicot (January 2002; Keleher) File No. NOL-06275 (ORHT)
at para. 6.
322. The Board's Guidelines support the application of a reasonableness standard with regard to discretion.
Interpretation Guideline #8, Review of an Order, states at 3 of 6:
Discretion refers to decisions such as whether relief from eviction should be granted (see section
83), or what remedies should be ordered in a particular case. The reviewing Member should not in-
terfere with the decision even if they may have exercised the discretion in a somewhat different way. A
review is not for making minor adjustments to the discretion which was reasonable:for example, that
an abatement was within the reasonable range of amounts which could have been ordered. [Emphasis
added.)
323. Supra note 275.
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example, the consideration of irrelevant (or inappropriate) factors or upon the failure
to consider relevant factors, then the discretion is exercised unreasonably.
In addition, the standard of review of discretionary decisions might be viewed as
similar to that applied to factual findings-i.e. "palpable and overriding error", which
is tantamount to being "clearly wrong" or "unreasonable.' 324 All of these phrases
point to a form of injustice and Graystone,325 McNamara No. 2,326 and Racicot3 27 all
referred to the test on discretion as including being so clearly wrong as to amount
to an injustice. But there is no valid distinction between "clearly wrong" and "so
clearly wrong", just as there was no true distinction between the standards of "un-
reasonable" and "patently unreasonable'.328 Fundamentally, however, once again, the
judicial terminology employed is not as important as the judicial approach applied to
an area of administrative decision-making where the principle of deference is firmly
entrenched.
REVIEWING QUESTIONS OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
The denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid.32
9
The principles of natural justice and procedural fairness concern the manner in
which a tribunal makes its decision. 330 The Board is required to comply with the re-
quirements of natural justice appropriate to the nature of the hearing, and a failure to
do so will result in its decision being quashed. A fair hearing is an independent and
unqualified right. 331 But what level of deference, if any, is appropriate to the Board's
procedural rulings? Moreover, what test is applied by the courts to assess whether
any deference should be accorded? In this regard, all that can be said with any degree
of certainty is that, while some deference may apply to Board decisions, the concept
of deference is not linked to the standard of review analysis.
324. H.L., supra note 209.
325. Supra note 304.
326. Supra note 299.
327. Supra note 314.
328. Dunsmuir, supra note 13 at paras. 41-42 per Bastarache and LeBel JJ.
329. Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution [ 1985] 2 SCR 643 at 661.
330. These two concepts are used here interchangeably to reflect the basic principles of the right to know
the case against a party and the opportunity to prepare and present a response. There is no discussion
in this paper of the apprehension of bias.
331. Supra note 329. In the residential tenancy context, see Manpel v. Greenwin Property Management
(2005), 200 O.A.C. 301 (Div. Ct.) at para. 16.
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Standard of Review of Procedural Choices
While issues of natural justice and procedural fairness are indisputably questions of
law, the standard of review analysis is not applied. 332 In London (City) v. Ayerswood
Development Corporation,333 the Court of Appeal stated, in relation to an alleged
lack of procedural fairness:
[A] court need not engage in an assessment of the appropriate standard of review. Rather,
the court is required to evaluate whether the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fair-
ness have been adhered to. The court does this by assessing the specific circumstances giv-
ing rise to the allegation and by determining what procedures and safeguards were required
in those circumstances in order to comply with the duty to act fairly.
334
Nevertheless, there is Supreme Court authority holding that compliance with the
rules of natural justice is a legal issue subject to a correctness standard.335 From one
perspective, this is highly questionable, given that the standard of review analysis is
inapplicable. Where there has been a breach of natural justice or fairness, the stan-
dard of review should not enter into consideration and the court must intervene as
the breach renders the decision void.
336
A "correctness" standard of review can make sense, nevertheless, from another per-
spective if the issue is reclassified. A breach of natural justice may also be character-
ized as a jurisdictional error, or as an excess of jurisdiction, in the sense that, even
though the Board may be acting within the subject matter granted to it by the legisla-
ture, its actions may nevertheless be ultra vires if it breaches the principles of natural
justice or the duty to be procedurally fair.337 Issues of jurisdiction are reviewed on a
correctness standard as a tribunal must be right with respect to its jurisdiction. The
332. Baker, supra note 258 at paras. 18-28. See also Davidson v. Bagla (2006), 216 O.A.C. 42 (Div. Ct.) at
paras. 6, 7.
333. London (City) v. Ayerswood [2002] O.J. No. 4859 (C.A.). See also Gismondi v. Ontario (Human Rights
Commission), [2003] 419 C.C.C.L (3d) 84 at para. 16 (Div. Ct.); and Amalgamated Transit Union Local
113 v. Ontario Labour Relations Board and Toronto Transit Commission (2007), 88 O.R. (3d) 361 (Div.
Ct.) at 374.
334. London (City) v. Ayerswood at para. 10. In lung v. Toronto Community Housing Corporation, [2007] O.J.
No. 4363 (Div. Ct.) [Jung is reported at (2007), 288 D.L.R. (4th) 225] Uung] the court found the funda-
mental issue to be procedural fairness and that where a tribunals decision is attacked on the basis of a
denial of natural justice it is not necessary for the court to engage in an assessment of the standard of
review.
335. Ellis-Don Limited v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 221 at para. 65 and C.UPE.,
supra note 300 at para. 100. See also Erdos v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 6 Immigration), [2003]
F.C.J. No. 1218 (F.C.) at para. 14.
336. See Igbinosun v. Law Society of Upper Canada (2007), 239 O.A.C. 178 (Div. Ct.) at para. 10; and Moreau-
Birub6, supra note 21, para. 74. See also Blake, supra note 14 at 214 [citing Ha v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship 6 Immigration) (2004), 236 D.L.R. (4th) 485 (EC.A.) at 500-502].
337. Jones and de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd., 2004)
at 242-44. Jung, supra note 334, can be viewed from this perspective in that the Tribunal had jurisdic-
tion to hear the applications but stepped outside its jurisdiction in determining that Ms. Jung was an
occupant and had no status to bring her tenants' rights application.
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applicable standard on questions of natural justice and procedural fairness has been
referred to as a kind of "modified form of correctness review" in that the courts are
the ultimate experts on procedures, but there will be occasions on which deference to
the tribunal's choice of procedures is required.338 This reflects a tension between the
courts as defenders of fair play and the procedural choices made by tribunals. What
level of deference may be accorded to the Board's procedures cannot be predicted with
any degree of certainty. Ultimately, the inquiry may turn on the court's perception of
whether the Board is in a better position than the court to render a decision. In this
regard, the analysis bears more than a passing resemblance to the most important
factor in the standard of review analysis, i.e. whether the Board has any recognized
expertise in determining the applicable procedural format in a given case.
The Content of the Duty of Fairness
While the Dunsmuir339 standard of review analysis is inapplicable to questions of
natural justice and procedural fairness, the specific content of the duty of procedural
fairness in a given case must be established. It has been observed that the standard
of review analysis and the criteria applied to determine the content of the duty of
procedural fairness are similar yet distinct lines of inquiry. There can be confusion
between the two because many of the factors considered in determining the require-
ments of procedural fairness are also involved in the standard of review analysis. 340
The central distinction is that the content of the duty of procedural fairness goes to
the manner in which the decision is made, whereas the standard of review is applied
to the product of the decision-maker's deliberations. If it is determined that there
is no breach of procedural fairness or other aspect of natural justice, the court may
embark upon a standard of review analysis.
341
338. Mullan, supra note 60 at 13. How much deference a court will give to a tribunal's choice of procedures
is an open question. In Baker, supra note 258, VHeureux-Dub6 J. found that "important weight must
be given to the procedures made by the tribunal itself and its institutional constraints.'
339. Supra note 13.
340. In C.UP.E, supra note 300 at para. 103, Binnie J. observed that overlapping factors include the nature
of the decision being made, the statutory scheme and the expertise of the decision maker. Other fac-
tors did not overlap. In procedural fairness, the court is concerned with the importance of the decision
to the individual affected, whereas in the standard of review there is consideration of the existence of
a privative clause. Binnie J. concluded: "The point is that, while there are some common 'factors: the
object of the Court's inquiry in each case is different'
341. Dunsmuir, supra note 13 at para. 47, states that reasonableness can also apply to the "process of articu-
lating the reasons.' In Clifford v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2008), 90 O.R. (3d) 742 at 753 (Div. Ct.)
[Clifford] the majority judgment concluded that the absence of reasons made it impossible to deter-
mine if the decision was a reasonable one and thus the decision was not a reasonable one as well as not
being in accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
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Assessing the content of the duty of procedural fairness depends on the context and
all the circumstances of the particular case. In Baker,342 the Supreme Court provided
a non-exhaustive list of five factors to consider:
343
1. The nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it;
2. The nature of the statutory scheme and the role of the particular decision
within that statutory scheme;
3. The importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected;
4. The legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and
5. A respect for the choices made in procedure by the decision maker.
344
The Baker 45 factors were applied in Jung v. Toronto Community Housing
Corporation.346 The tenant moved into her grandmother's social housing unit and
cared for her until her passing twelve years later. The landlord applied to evict the
tenant on the grounds that she was an unauthorized occupant 347 and the tenant
applied for a determination of her rights under the TPA. The landlord argued that
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the tenant's application.348 Ultimately, the
Tribunal refused to hear the tenant's application on the grounds of her lack of status
as a tenant, refused an adjournment to consider its jurisdiction and ordered the ten-
ant's eviction. On appeal, the court determined the content of the duty of fairness in
the circumstances:
The fundamental decisions to be made were whether Ms. Jung had any rights in the unit and
whether the landlord could evict her. The scheme of the legislation is designed to have such
issues dealt with in a straightforward and expeditious manner. The decision is particularly
important to Ms. Jung because she would be deprived of accommodation. It is important
to the landlord but of no immediate consequence to the Corporation. Ms. Jung had lived
with her grandmother for 12 years. She had a legitimate expectation that she would have a
hearing before she was evicted. With respect to the Tribunal's choice of procedure, the Act
342. Supra note 258.
343. Ibid. at paras. 23-28.
344. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the five factors and applied them in Congregatation des temoins de
Jehovah de St. Jerome-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650 at para. 5 and 11, although
McLachlin C.J., for the majority judgment, restated the fifth factor in slightly different words:
The fifth factor-the nature of the deference owed due to the decision maker-calls upon the re-
viewing Court to acknowledge that the public body may be better positioned than the judiciary in
certain matters to render a decision, and to examine whether the decision in question falls within
this realm.
345. Supra note 258.
346. Supra note 334.
347. Supra note 3, TPA section 81(1). RTA, supra note 2, section 100(1) provides a tenant may not make a
transfer of the possession of his or her unit to another person without the consent of the landlord to
sublet or assign the unit.
348. Supra note 334 at 3.
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contains different requirements depending on the issue under consideration. For example,
if the Tribunal makes an order under s. 72 and the tenant moves to set it aside, under s.
72(10), the Tribunal "shall hold a hearing" If the Tribunal sets aside an order made under s.
76, then under s. 76(8), the Tribunal "shall hear the merits of the application:' Under s. 81
(to which Member Taylor referred), the "landlord may apply to the tribunal for an order"
but there are no procedural requirements. In the printed information attached to the Form
A2 and T2 the recipient is told that once the application is filed, "the Tribunal will give the
tenant a Notice of Hearing:' The printed information also refers the recipient to the Rules
and Guidelines from the local Tribunal office that include references to oral hearings, writ-
ten hearings and electronic hearings.
349
The court concluded that the content of the duty of procedural fairness required that
the applicant be given notice of the facts, arguments and considerations upon which
the decision was based, and an opportunity to make submissions at an oral hearing:
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Jung was entitled to have an oral hearing in which evidence
would be led and legal submissions would be heard and considered as to her status. Procedural
fairness dictates that Ms. Jung be given notice of thefacts, arguments and considerations upon
which the decision is to be based and an opportunity to make submissions. 350
The court's conclusion is eminently reasonable, primarily because the TPA itself con-
templated an oral hearing where it is alleged there is an unauthorized occupant. The
TPA did not provide any statutory discretion to the Tribunal to decide what type of
hearing should be afforded in these circumstances. In effect, the Tribunal erred by
deciding the application based solely on the landlord's submissions. The Tribunal
determined the issue of the occupant's legal status without providing her with the
opportunity to present her evidence and argument and, in so doing, committed a
clear breach of the duty of procedural fairness.
REVIEWING THE DUTY TO GIVE REASONS
The most important person in a lawsuit is not the judge, sitting in elevated dignity on
the dais, nor the lawyers, however eminent they might be; it is the losing party.35 1
Traditionally, the principles of fairness did not impose a general duty on a tribunal
to provide reasons. However, with the landmark decision in Baker,352 it is now es-
tablished that the duty to give written reasons exists in the common law, in certain
circumstances, and is a component of the duty of procedural fairness. The failure
to provide meaningful reasons supporting a decision may, in itself, be a breach of
349. Supra note 334 at paras. 21-23 [emphasis added].
350. Ibid. at para. 24 [emphasis added].
351. Sir Robert McGarry, "Temptations of the Bench" [1978] 16 Alta. L. Rev. at 406.
352. Supra note 258.
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natural justice that warrants quashing the decision. 353 The importance of full and
complete reasons has been emphasized repeatedly.
354
In Baker,355 the Supreme Court dealt with the judicial review of the decision of an
immigration officer who refused an application for permission, on humanitarian
and compassionate grounds, to remain in Canada. Considering the role of reasons in
the duty of fairness analysis, Justice EHeureux-Dub6 concluded:
In my opinion, it is now appropriate to recognize that, in certain circumstances, the duty of
procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision. The
strong arguments demonstrating the advantages of written reasons suggest that, in cases
such as this where the decision has important significance for the individual, when there
is a statutory right of appeal, or in other circumstances, some form of reasons should be
required.... It would be unfair for a person subject to a decision such as this one which is
so critical to their future not to be told why the result was reached.
3 56
It is to be noted that there is no statutory requirement under the RTA for the Board
to provide reasons, and Rule 26 of the Board's Rules of Practice provides that reasons
will not necessarily be issued in all cases. Where a party wishes reasons it may request
them orally at the hearing or in writing within thirty days after the order is issued.357
However, given that there is a statutory right of appeal and a great volume of Board
353. In Waxman, supra note 195 at paras. 307, 308 the Court of Appeal noted:
The emphasis in Housen on the application of the "palpable and overriding" standard to the process
by which findings of fact are made moves reasons for judgment to the centre of the appellate review
stage. Reasons for judgment can be so cryptic or incomplete as to provide little or no insight into the
fact-finding process. Where reasons for judgment are so deficient that they effectively deny meaningful
appellate review on a "palpable and overriding" standard, the inadequacy of the reasons may in and of
itselfjustify appellate intervention [citations omitted]. [Emphasis added.]
354. See R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 for an example in the criminal law context. See also Lerew v. St.
Lawrence College, [2005] O.J. No. 1436 (Div. Ct.); and Megens v. Ontario Racing Commission (2003), 64
O.R. (3d) 142 (Div. Ct.). The Ontario Court of Appeal in Gray v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support
Program) (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 364 at para. 22 (C.A) provided a detailed overview of the duty to give
reasons. McMurtry, C.J.O. stated:
Recently, the Federal Court of Appeal considered the nature and extent of a statutory duty to give
reasons in VIA Rail Canada Inc. v. Canada (National Transportation Agency), [2001] 2 F.C. 35:
The duty to give reasons is only fulfilled if the reasons provided are adequate. What constitutes
adequate reasons is a matter to be determined in light of the particular circumstances of each
case. However, as a general rule, adequate reasons are those that serve the functions for which
the duty to provide them was imposed. In the words of my learned colleague Evans J.A., "[a]ny
attempt to formulate a standard of adequacy that must be met before a tribunal can be said to
have discharged its duty to give reasons must ultimately reflect the purposes served by a duty to
give reasons" [citation omitted].
355. Supra note 258.
356. Ibid. at para. 43.
357. The commentary under Rule 26.2 provides:
Subsection 17(1) of the SPPA requires a tribunal to issue written reasons for its orders upon the
request of any party. The Board will exercise its authority to issue reasons on its own initiative in
some cases, and will issue reasons when requested under this Rule. However, in most cases, written
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hearings involve eviction applications and thus have very important significance to
tenants, it is argued that the Board has a general common law duty to provide rea-
sons. These reasons are required from the Board in order to be fair to the parties who
are entitled to know why the Board decided as it did, to foster just decisions and to
enable a meaningful right of appeal, if desired.
Standard of Review and the Duty to Give Reasons
The duty to provide adequate or meaningful reasons is an aspect of the duty to act
fairly. Thus, the failure to provide adequate reasons may itself be a breach of the
principles of procedural fairness and, as such, the standard of review analysis is in-
applicable. However, in Dunsmuir,358 the Supreme Court defined the reasonableness
standard as including an inquiry "into the qualities that make a decision reasonable,
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes' 359
The standard of review analysis does not apply to the duty to give reasons and, more-
over, is unnecessary. The failure to provide adequate reasons constitutes a breach of
procedural fairness and is compatible with a reasonableness standard, to the extent
that "reasonableness" can be equated with "adequate". By definition, inadequate rea-
sons would constitute an unreasonable decision because a reviewing court is unable
to determine whether the decision is a reasonable one. Reasons must exist to some
extent to allow the reviewing process to be carried out. A decision that fails to pro-
vide adequate reasons is not in accordance with principles of procedural fairness and
is defacto unreasonable.
360
We now turn to the analysis to be applied with regard to the Board's duty to provide
reasons. The two essential inquiries are: what can be considered to constitute the
reasons and, if some reasons are provided, what constitutes adequate reasons?36
1
What Are the Reasons?
As a starting point, any review of the reasons given cannot be done in isolation. The
provision of reasons for a decision must be looked at in the context of the entire
administrative decision-making structure. Where there are administrative proced-
ures, such as an internal review or appeal, the fact that the internal review decision
reasons will not be issued. Parties who intend to request a review of an order or appeal it are encour-
aged to ask for written reasons as soon as possible after the order is issued.
358. Supra note 13. See also Ryan, supra note 22.
359. Supra note 13 at para. 47.
360. See Clifford, supra note 341.
361. In Via Rail, supra note 354 at 35, 36. The court held, "The duty to give reasons is only fuffilled if the
reasons are adequate. What constitutes adequate reasons is a matter to be determined in light of the
particular circumstances of each case'
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contains little, if any, reasons may not be determinative. In Baker,362 in an immigra-
tion law context, the Supreme Court found that the notes of a subordinate reviewing
officer could be taken, by inference, to be the reasons for the decision made by a
senior officer.
363
How does one recognize reasons for a decision and how do they differ from mere
conclusions? In Kalin v. Ontario College of Teachers,364 the applicant, a teacher, re-
quested an adjournment. The College heard submissions from both parties and de-
nied the adjournment, stating only:
The Committee is satisfied that the notice of hearing was properly served and allowed suf-
ficient time for the Member to make arrangements to be present, and therefore, the motion
by the defence for an adjournment is denied.365
On appeal, the court noted:
These are not reasons. It is not sufficient for the Tribunal to merely state that it agrees with
the submissions of one party without stating why. In this case there is no indication that the
Tribunal weighed the various pros and cons in the balance in reaching the conclusions it
did. That is a breach of natural justice.
366
In Toronto Community Housing Corporation v. Greaves,367 the landlord argued that
the court ought not to decide the appeal on the basis of absence of reasons because
the tenant failed to request such reasons.368 The court rejected the submission:
The Tribunals decision in this case was five pages long. As noted above, the decision cul-
minates with the heading "It is ordered that:" followed by five numbered sub-paragraphs
setting out the Member's order. In our view, it was reasonable for the tenant to conclude, as
she did, that these five points are the orders of the Member and that the preceding two pages
of the decision are the Member's reasons for the orders made. Section 23.1 is appropriately
invoked where no reasons whatsoever are provided, but merely an order. It is not appropriately
invoked in a situation in which a Member has given some form of written reasons, but which
the tenant considers to be deficient. We do not fault the tenant in this situation for failing to
362. Supra note 258.
363. Ibid. at para 44.
364. Kalin, supra note 273.
365. Ibid. at para. 29.
366. Ibid. at para. 61. See also Knights Village Non-Profit Homes v. Chartier, [2005] O.J. No. 2376 (Div. Ct.)
where the court found that the failure to give reasons for the denial of an extension of time to request
a review of an order was a breach of procedural fairness. The Tribunal failed to explain the decision
reached and merely stated that the tenant had not provided valid reasons for the request.
367. Supra note 61.
368. Rule 23.1 of the Board Rules of Practice and Procedure provides:
23.1 If a party wished the Member to issue written reasons for the order, the party must make the
request:
(a) orally at the hearing; or (b) in writing within 30 days after the order is issued.
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request more fulsome reasons in writing and we do not consider her failure to do so to be a
barrier to her raising the inadequacy of the reasons as a ground of appeal.
369
When Are the Reasons Inadequate?
In Gray v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program),370 the Court of Appeal set
out succinctly the requirements for adequate reasons:
The obligation to provide adequate reasons is not satisfied by merely reciting the submis-
sions and evidence of the parties and stating a conclusion. Rather, the decision maker must
set out its findings of fact and the principal evidence upon which those findings were based.
The reasons must address the major points in issue. The reasoning process followed by
the decision maker must be set out and must reflect consideration of the main relevant
factors.
37 1
The critical point with regard to the adequacy of reasons is that perfection is not
required. Reasons may be less than ideal but still deemed to be adequate,372 but it is
clear that it is insufficient to merely summarize the positions of the parties and then
simply state conclusions.
In Stanoulis v. Lykakim Holdings Ltd.,373 the Board's reasons were found to be inad-
equate. The landlord applied to evict on the grounds that he required the residence
for his son, and the tenants countered with an application claiming that there was no
landlord and tenant relationship and that they occupied the premises as licensees.
The court concluded that meaningful appellate review was impossible as the Board's
reasons were "merely conclusory" 374 Similarly, in Greaves,375 the court noted that
369. Supra note 61 at para. 17 [emphasis added].
370. Supra note 354.
371. Ibid. at para. 22 [citing Via Rail Canada Inc. v. National Transportation Agency, [2001] 2 EC. 25
(C.A.)].
372. In R. v. Walker, 2008 SCC 34 (Can LII), the Supreme Court recently re-emphasized that reasons do not
confer a "free standing right of appeal" and that the failure to live up to the duty does not necessarily
entitle a party to appellate intervention. Reasons have to be sufficient only to meet their purpose, and
the court concluded that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained why the accused was acquitted
of second-degree murder despite the fact that the oral reasons "fell well short of the ideal' The court
held, at para. 20 that "Reasons are sufficient if they are responsive to the case's live issues and the par-
ties' key arguments. Their sufficiency should be measured not in the abstract, but as they respond to
the substance of what was in issue."
373. [20081 O.J. No. 1845 (Div. Ct.).
374. Ibid. at para. 12. The court found that there was no factual analysis, no findings of credibility and no
indication of what evidence was taken into account on any issue. For example, on the issue of the land-
lord requiring possession the Board stated, at para. 6: "On a balance of probabilities, the Landlord in
good faith requires possession of the rental unit for the purpose of residential accommodation of his
Nick Stanoulis and Nick's family."
375. Supra note 61. See also Fisher v. Moir, [2005] O.J. No. 4479 (Div. Ct.) for an example of a court's dis-
satisfaction with the Tribunal's duty to give reasons.
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the Tribunal failed to give any reasons for finding that the tenant committed an il-
legal act:
There are no reasons given for the finding that the tenant committed an illegal act in the
face of a dispute that obviously required credibility findings, as only two eye witnesses (the
parties to the altercation) testified. In fact, the decision is devoid of reasons. It merely recites
the positions of the parties. We are of the view that such a decision given without reasons for
believing one of the two protagonists in an altercation cannot stand [citation omitted].
3 76
The court also criticized the absence of any analysis or reasons as to whether the
tenant should be granted relief from eviction:
[T]he reasons are silent on the undisputed fact that the sole basis for the landlord's decision
to evict was the laying of the criminal charge against Ms. Greaves and that the landlord
had done no independent investigation of the incident. There is also no mention in the
reasons that the police officer, who laid the charge against the tenant, refused the request
of Ms. Greaves to lay an information against the other tenant involved in the altercation,
with the resulting need for Ms. Greaves to appear before a justice of the peace to lay the
information 377 ...
It is evident that notwithstanding the above-noted paragraph of the Member's decision
which is headed "Section 84 Consideration" there is no analysis of s. 84 contained in that
paragraph. The paragraph seems predicated on the assumption that the only consideration
required in a s. 84 analysis is the need for children to complete the school year.
37 8
In contrast, in Jackson v. Toronto Catholic School Board,379 the court found the school
board's reasons were very close to being inadequate but that, in the circumstances,
meaningful review was not thwarted. An eleven-year-old boy brought a knife to
school. At recess, he took the knife into the schoolyard where, it was alleged, he
threatened fellow students with the knife. After an inquiry, the school principal im-
posed a limited expulsion of one year. The principal's decision was appealed to the
school board. The school board denied the appeal.
It was argued that the school board failed to give reasons for its decision. In dismiss-
ing the appeal, the school board merely noted that it was "satisfied that the Principal
... considered all relevant factors in arriving at his decision."380 The court stated that
these reasons "fall dangerously close to being inadequate"38 1 and that the proper
course of action would normally be to return the matter to the school board. It con-
cluded, however:
When we examine the rationale for requiring adequate reasons, we are reluctant to return
the matter to the [school board]. Reasons are required to inform the losing party why they
376. Ibid. note 61 at paras. 14, 15 [emphasis added].
377. Ibid. at para. 21.
378. Ibid. at para. 19.
379. (2006), 214 O.A.C. 39 (Div. Ct.).
380. Ibid. at para. 53.
381. Ibid. at para 54.
"But Only on a Question of Law" 173
lost and to equip that party with sufficient information to effectively pursue an appeal, if
desired...
Any suggestion of the inability of Ms. [Jackson] to effectively pursue her appeal is dispelled
by the factum filed on her behalf, containing fifty-three pages comprising one hundred and
seventy paragraphs. The factum attacks the decision of the [school board] on at least sixteen
different fronts. It cannot be said the failure to give more detailed reasons has in any way
impaired Ms. [Jackson]'s ability to mount an effective appeal.
3 82
In the end, all that can be stated with certainty is that there is no clear distinction
between adequate and inadequate reasons. Each case will turn on its particular facts,
the perspective of the particular court, and, in some instances, on the perspective of
the particular judge. In Jacobs Catalytic Ltd. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 353,383 the majority and minority judgments disagreed as to whether
the reasons provided were inadequate. The majority found that the reasons were "far
from the thorough and careful reasons" that were generally issued by the Ontario
Labour Relations Board but were nonetheless "adequate for this Court to a carry out
its judicial review function",384 In contrast, the minority decision, in an extensive




The role of an appellate court is to correct legal error. Appeals are the exception
rather than the rule and the guiding assumption is that the quasi-judicial system of
tribunal decision making is just and reasonable. There are strong policy reasons for
this approach, and the bases set out in Housen386 for deferring to findings of fact of
trial judges are generally applicable to assist in understanding the general judicial
temperament toward the proper scope of appellate review with respect to the Board.
In particular, the overall scarcity of judicial resources, promoting the integrity of
Board proceedings, and recognizing the advantageous position of the Board in fact-
finding are all important underlying considerations. 387 But a distinction must be
drawn between the Board as being better positioned to make factual findings388 and
its lack of any specialized expertise in making factual findings, applying the facts to
the law, or interpreting the law.
382. Ibid. at paras. 57, 58 [emphasis added].
383. Supra note 75.
384. Ibid. per Cumming and Swinton JJ., at para 51.
385. Ibid. per Smith J. at 38-46. See, in particular at 39, para. 85. See also Clifford, supra note 341 where there
was a 2-1 split of the Divisional Court panel as to whether adequate reasons had been provided.
386. Supra note 115.
387. Ibid. at paras. 16-18.
388. Primarily because the Board is exposed to the entire case and sees and hears from all the witnesses.
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In the vast majority of appeals under the RTA, the applicable standard of review has
been correctness, and the decision in Dunsmuir 89 will not alter this result.390 Given
the statutory right of appeal and, most significantly, the lack of any highly specialized
expertise at the Board, a reviewing court will always be in an equal or better position
to decide the question of law before it.
The fact that there is no express reference in the RTA to appeals based on ques-
tions of fact or mixed fact and law is not an absolute bar to appellate review of those
questions.
Despite the provision in the RTA regarding appeals "only on questions of law",
391
the central inquiry becomes one of delineating the boundaries of what constitutes
a question of law. Questions of law are a broader category than merely determining
what the "correct legal test" may be. They include breaches of natural justice and
procedural fairness, which are questions of law unrelated to the determination of any
correct legal test or standard.
Questions of mixed fact and law fall along a spectrum, and the closer they come to
the legal end the more likely the error can be identified as a "pure" question of law.
392
As observed in Dunsmuir,39 3 questions of mixed fact and law will vary. The central
determination will be whether this a question of identifying the "contours and the
content of a legal rule" or whether it is a matter of simply applying the rule to a set
of facts. The former is more clearly a question of law. The latter is not, and judicial
deference will be accorded.394 With respect to the review of questions of fact, it will
have to be established that there was some "palpable and overriding error" such as
no evidence at all, a failure to consider relevant evidence, or a clear misapprehension
of the evidence, before a court will intervene in the Board's fact-finding process.
In addition, it is possible to also contest the fact-finding process where the reasons
given are inadequate and the reviewing court is unable to determine on what basis
certain facts were found, such as, for instance, those facts based primarily on assess-
ments of credibility.
Finally, there are two major exceptions or, at least, partial conceptual departures
from the appellate review of the Board on questions of law based on the Dunsmuir
39 5
389. Supra note 13.
390. In Darragh, supra note 50 at para. 13, counsel for the landlord unsuccessfully argued that the standard
of review should be reasonableness, relying on Dunsmuir, supra note 13 at para. 54, which stated that
deference would be the usual result where a tribunal was interpreting its own statute or statutes closely
connected, with which it would have particular familiarity. Binnie J. referred to this, at para. 156, as an
adjudicator's "home turf" statutory framework.
391. Supra note 2.
392. Supra note 115 at para. 8. The term "pure question of law" is referred to but not defined.
393. Supra note 13.
394. Ibid. at paras. 161-64, per Deschamps J.
395. Supra note 13.
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standard of review analysis. First, questions of natural justice and procedural fair-
ness, including the duty to give reasons, do not attract the Dunsmuir39 6 analysis. A
somewhat similar but clearly distinct test is applied, as set out in Baker,397 which
grants a measure of deference to a tribunal's procedural choices. What measure of
deference a court would grant to the Board is an open question with little jurispru-
dential guidance.
Second, discretionary decisions may also constitute reviewable questions of law but
they have not attracted the standard of review analysis. While the Board's discre-
tionary decisions, such as relief from eviction or imposing terms and conditions,
may, at some point in the future, be subjected to a standard of review analysis, it is
more probable that the "error in principle" (or "clearly wrong") analysis will con-
tinue to be the operative standard as it is long established in the residential tenancy
jurisprudence. Absent such error in principle, if the standard of review analysis was
applied to the Board's discretionary decisions, the standard applied would likely be
reasonableness.
Ultimately, the legal terminology adopted may just be a matter of semantics-a fair
degree of judicial deference is applied to the exercise of discretion, absent error in
principle, regardless of the specific legal label applied to describe the standard of
review. However, it must be recognized that the varying standards of review-the
Maple Lodge398 rule and the discrete grounds standard; the Baker3 99 reasonableness
standard; and the Graystone400 error in principle standard-that may be applied do
create uncertainty and confusion. These varying standards of review leave consider-
able scope for reviewing courts to intervene40 1 in the overall merits of a decision or




397. Supra note 258.
398. Supra note 275.
399. Supra note 258.
400. Supra note 304.
401. Arguably, such intervention occurred in Racicot, supra note 314.
402. Mullan, supra note 60 at 95.

